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"Other Crimes" Evidence in
Sex Offense Cases
David P. Bryden* and Roger C. Park**
"It is fundamental to American jurisprudence that 'a defendant must
be tried for what he did, not for who he is.'"
United States v. Foskey'
"lBlehavior science research... shows that, by and large, the best way
to predict anybody's behavior is his behavior in the past .... "
Paul Meehl 2
A cardinal tenet of Anglo-Saxon criminal jurisprudence is
that the prosecution must prove that the accused committed a
specific crime, not merely that he is dangerous or wicked. Our
attachment to this principle is so strong that courts carry it a
step further and usually exclude evidence of the defendant's bad
character, even if it is relevant to his guilt of the crime charged.3
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also like to thank the other participants in faculty colloquia at the University of
Minnesota Law School for useful suggestions. Professor Park presented an ear-
lier version of the authors' work as the Kenneth J. Hodson lecture at the Judge
Advocate General's School in Charlottesville, Virginia, on March 25, 1993; that
lecture will be published in the Military Law Review.
Comments or requests for reprints may be directed to the authors at the
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or through e-mail (parkx003@maroon.tc.umn.edu).
1. 636 F.2d 517,523 (D.C. Cir. 1980), quoted in McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE,
PRACTITIONER TREATISE SERIES § 190, at 797 n.1 (John W. Strong et al. eds., 4th
ed. 1992) [hereinafter MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE].
2. Paul E. Meehi, Law and the Fireside Inductions (with Postscript):
Some Reflections of a Clinical Psychologist, 7 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 521, 532
(1989).
3. See FED. R. EvID. 404 and advisory committee's note. This approach is
often contrasted with the European approach, under which courts freely receive
evidence of prior criminal history. See Department of Justice, Office of Legal
Policy, The Admission of Criminal Histories at Trial, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 707,
751 (1989) (noting that in European criminal proceedings, criminal history is
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:529
This rule has come under sharp attack in Congress and the
courts on the ground that it enables sex offenders to escape pun-
ishment.4 The televised trial of William Kennedy Smith height-
ened public awareness of the problem. Smith was accused of
raping a woman whom he met in a bar in Palm Beach. She had
gone with him to the vacation house at which he was staying
and the two went for a walk along the beach. She testified that
he took off his clothes, tackled her when she tried to leave, and
raped her. He admitted having intercourse but claimed that she
consented and that she started to behave irrationally when he
called her by the wrong name.5 At a pretrial hearing, the prose-
cution offered testimony by three other women that Smith had
sexually assaulted them.6 The trial judge excluded the evidence
under Florida law,7 and the jury ultimately acquitted Smith.8
This decision to exclude was not a freak of local law; it was con-
sistent with the law of many, but not all, jurisdictions.9
"routinely admitted"). But cf Miijan Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Convic-
tion and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA.
L. REv. 506, 518 (1973) (maintaining that while continental jurists do not for-
mally exclude criminal records from evidence, they normally regard a criminal
conviction as logically irrelevant to a determination of guilt).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 159-62.
5. Timothy Clifford, Smith on Stand: Y Got Picked Up" Says Sex Consen-
sual, NEWSDAY, Dec. 11, 1991, at 5 (describing courtroom testimony).
6. In two cases, the women reported that Smith suddenly became aggres-
sive, pinned them down, and pawed them, but that they were able to repulse
him. A third woman reported that after she became intoxicated at a party that
she and Smith attended, they returned to Smith's apartment where he made
unwelcome sexual advances and, although she said no and tried to fight him off,
he forced her to have intercourse with him. Larry Tye et al., Alleged Assaults
by Smith Described. Accounts by 3 Women are Similar to Charges in Palm
Beach Rape Case, BOSTON GLOBE, July 24, 1991, at 1.
7. See Michael Hedges, Other Women Paint Smith as Violent, 2vot Too
Bright', WASH. TIMEs, Dec. 7, 1991, at A4 (describing exclusion of evidence).
8. Paul Richter, Jury Acquits Smith of Rape at Kennedy Estate, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 12, 1991, at Al (describing acquittal).
9. See State v. Saltarelli, 655 P.2d 697 (Wash. 1982). In Saltarelli, the
defendant, charged with the rape of an acquaintance, raised a consent defense.
Id. The court held that it was reversible error to receive evidence of the defend-
ant's prior attempted rape of a different woman. Id. at 700-01. In People v.
Tassell, 679 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1984) (en banc), the court held that it was error,
though harmless, to admit evidence of two prior rapes by a defendant charged
with acquaintance rape. In Reichard v. State, 510 N.E.2d 163 (Ind. 1987), the
defendant was accused of a knife-point rape of a woman with whom he had a
dating relationship. Id. at 165. The court held that it was reversible error to
receive evidence of "prior alleged rapes perpetrated by him upon various indi-
viduals." Id. at 165, 166. The court also remarked that "the trial court incor-
rectly categorized rape of an adult woman as depraved sexual conduct." Id. at
165. In Lovely v. United States, 169 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1948), the defendant
was accused of raping an acquaintance after driving her to a remote part of a
530
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The exclusion issue also arises in "stranger rape" cases,
when the defendant claims the victim misidentified him and the
prosecution seeks to introduce evidence that he committed other
rapes. In this context, courts sometimes exclude the uncharged
misconduct evidence as contrary to the rule against character
evidence. 10 Some courts, however, are more willing to admit the
evidence in stranger rape cases than in consent defense cases."
federal military base. Id. at 387-88. The court excluded evidence of a rape 15
days earlier on the same base, reasoning that the rape of one woman had no
tendency to prove that another woman did not consent. Id. at 388, 390. In
Brown v. State, 459 N.E.2d 376 (Ind. 1984), the defendant met his victim in a
gas station and drove her to a cornfield where he threatened, raped, and beat
the victim. Id. at 377. Two other victims testified to rapes by the defendant in
secluded areas after getting or giving him rides in a vehicle. Id. at 378-79. The
court held that receiving this evidence was reversible error but indicated that
the evidence might be admissible were identity in issue. Id. at 379. The court
also held, however, that the evidence was not admissible in the case at bar be-
cause the defense was consent. Id. Further, the court distinguished depraved
sexual instinct cases involving sodomy and incest. Id. But see State v. Crocker,
409 N.W.2d 840 (Minn. 1987), in which the court held it was not an error to
admit evidence of prior sex crimes against children in a case in which the de-
fendant raised a consent defense in response to an accusation of the rape of an
adult victim. Id. at 843. The court reasoned that the evidence showed a "pat-
tern" of opportunistic assaults on vulnerable victims. Id. See generally Sara S.
Beale, Prior Similar Acts in Prosecutions for Rape and Child Sex Abuse, 4 Cmui.
L.F. 307 (1993).
10. See, e.g., Vaughn v. State, 604 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992). In
Vaughn, the court held inadmissible evidence of the rape of a prostitute in an
alley when the defendant was accused of raping a sixty-year-old victim whom
he had awakened in the victim's bedroom. Id. at 1272-73. People v. Sanza, 509
N.Y.S.2d 311 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986), held that in a prosecution for rape and
murder in New York state, evidence that the accused had raped three victims in
Florida was inadmissible. Id. at 314-15. White v. Commonwealth, 388 S.E.2d
645 (Va. Ct. App. 1990), overruled on other grounds by Lavinder v. Common-
wealth, 407 S.E.2d 910 (Va. Ct. App. 1991), held inadmissible the evidence that
the defendant, accused of raping a woman in the women's rest room, had ap-
proached, three hours earlier, another woman, knife in hand, in another wo-
men's rest room. Id. at 645-47, 649.
11. Some of the courts that have rejected the evidence in consent defense
cases have indicated in dicta that they would accept the evidence in alibi de-
fense (stranger rape) cases because of its relevance to identity. See People v.
Tassell, 679 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1984) (en banc); Brown v. State, 459 N.E.2d 376, 378-
379 (Ind. 1984). Other courts have held prior sex crime evidence admissible in
cases in which identity is in issue, without making an explicit comparison to
consent defense cases. See, e.g., State v. Hanks, 694 P.2d 407 (Kan. 1985). In
Hanks, the defendant was accused of raping a victim while he was wearing a
ski mask. Id. at 411. The court held that the evidence of three other rapes, in
which the defendant had used threats and violence and had wielded a knife,
though not wearing a mask, was sufficiently similar to be admitted for the pur-
pose of establishing the rapists identity. Id. at 412-13. In Coleman v. State,
621 P.2d 869 (Alaska 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1090 (1981), similarities in
race and age of victims, along with a similar situs of attack and a similar man-
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A third type of case involves child sexual abuse. As in
stranger rape cases, the accused cannot claim that the victim
consented. The defense may claim, however, that no sexual
abuse occurred, or that another person committed the offense.
The prosecution in turn may offer evidence that on other occa-
sions the defendant molested the same child or other children.
Courts are divided about the admissibility of such evidence. 12
ner of subduing the victim from behind, sufficed to allow evidence of other
crimes to prove identity. Id. at 875. Jenkins v. State, 356 S.E.2d 525 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1987), held that evidence of the defendant's prior sexual assault was ad-
missible to establish identity in an attempted rape charge in which no dispute
existed that the defendant had committed a prior assault. Id. at 526. Both the
prior assault and the charged crime involved a sexual assault upon a woman
who had no prior personal connection with the defendant and who frustrated
the assault by screaming. Id. In Copeland v. State, 455 S.2d 951 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1984), cert. denied, 455 So. 2d 956 (Ala. 1984), the court held that the prior
rape and the charged rape were sufficiently similar to meet the admissibility
standard for establishing identity when both incidents occurred in the same
neighborhood; the attacks were late at night; a muscular attacker entered
homes by breaking a window; he also wore a mask, brandished a weapon, and
smelled bad. Id. at 954-55. In Humphrey v. State, 304 So. 2d 617 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1974), a similarity linking two rapes and one attempted rape was that the
attacker walked unarmed into the victim's bedrooms to attack them. Id. at 618,
612-22. The court held that the evidence was admissible to prove identity. Id.
at 623-24. Cf State v. Mason, 827 P.2d 748 (Kan. 1992). In Mason, the defend-
ant was accused of the attempted rape of an 89-year-old victim. Id. at 750. The
court held admissible evidence of the prior murder of a 76-year-old victim, in
which the defendant asked to use the phone to gain entry and strangled the
victim with a sock. Id. at 756-57. The court reasoned that the prior crime was
sufficiently similar to the charged crime in which the defendant gained entry to
the home by asking to use the phone and later prepared the stocking in his
hands before fleeing the victim's house. Id. at 750, 757.
12. Hall v. State, 419 S.E.2d 503 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, No.
$92C1194, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 707 (Ga. Sept. 8, 1992). In Hall, the defendant was
accused of molesting his teenage daughter. Id. at 504. Testimony that 16 years
earlier the defendant had molested his teenage sister was admissible, even
though his sister alleged penetration and his daughter did not. Id. at 505.
Also, the daughter alleged continuing contacts but his sister alleged only one
incident. Id. In State v. Floody, 481 N.W.2d 242 (S.D. 1992), the defendant was
charged with the rape of a six-year-old. Id. at 245. Evidence of other sexual
contact between the defendant and the victim, when the parents of the victim
were not at home, was held admissible to show plan or course of criminal activ-
ity. Id. at 254. In State v. Miller, 632 P.2d 552 (Ariz. 1981) (en banc), evidence
of a prior molestation of another child victim was held admissible to prove iden-
tity when the victim in the charged crime was unable to identify the defendant.
Id. at 554-55. Both incidents were similar in that they occurred at the same
time of day, the man bore the same description, and both children were fondled
in the same way after the man broke into the residence through a bedroom
window. Id. at 554. Contra State v. Winget, 310 P.2d 738 (Utah 1957). In Win-
get, the defendant was accused of the sexual abuse of his eight-year-old daugh-
ter. Id. at 738. The court held that it was reversible error to allow his 17-year-
old stepdaughter to testify that he had abused her as a child. Id. at 739. In
532
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Congress is now considering legislation that would allow
the prosecution to introduce evidence of the accused's other
crimes in most federal sex offense cases.13 Meanwhile, the
courts are still wrestling with the issue.
The purpose of this Article is to reconsider the rule against
evidence of uncharged misconduct by the accused as it pertains
to sex offenses. Although the focus is primarily on rape, much of
the analysis has implications for child sexual abuse cases as
well. We begin with an examination of the traditional excep-
tions to the rule and the circumstances in which courts have ap-
plied those exceptions to sex crimes. We then consider whether
the rule should be discarded. Finally, we evaluate the alterna-
tive of retaining the rule against uncharged misconduct evi-
dence, but creating a general or limited exception for sex
offenses.
People v. Jones, 335 N.W.2d 465 (Mich. 1983) (per curiam), the State charged
the accused with a crime arising from sexual intercourse with his 15-year-old
stepdaughter. Id. The court held it reversible error to admit testimony by his
natural daughter and another stepdaughter of the defendant's sexual activity
with them. Id. at 465, 467. In Government of Virgin Islands v. Pinney, 967
F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1992), the prosecution of an 18-year-old defendant for the rape
of a seven-year-old girl presented testimony of the victim's sister that the ac-
cused had also raped the sister six years earlier when she was six. Id. at 913.
The court held that it was reversible error to admit the testimony. Id. at 915-
16. In People v. Woltz, 592 N.E.2d 1182 (IlM. App. 3d 1992), the defendant was
accused of digital penetration and other forcible touching of a 12-year-old girl.
Id. at 1183. Evidence of a prior rape of a 14-year-old was inadmissible. Id. at
1184, 1185-86. In Kelly v. State, 828 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), the
defendant was charged with sexual assault on a nine-year-old girl. Id. at 163.
The court held it reversible error to admit testimony by a nine-year-old witness,
who was a friend of the complainant, about other acts committed by the defend-
ant with the complainant and the witness. Id. at 163, 165-66. In Owens v.
State, 827 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), the court held it was reversible
error, in a prosecution of the defendant for sexual assault of the defendant's
daughter, to admit testimony of the defendant's alleged rape of his older daugh-
ter. Id. at 913, 915-17. In Bolden v. State, 720 P.2d 957 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986),
the defendant was accused of sexual conduct with two underage girls, both of
them his daughters. Id. at 958. The court held it was reversible error to admit
evidence of the defendant's sexual conduct with other daughters and their un-
derage friends. Id. at 959, 960. The court also noted that when identity and
intent are not in issue, the only available defense is that the acts were not com-
mitted. Id. at 961.
13. S. 1607, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 121 (1993).
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I. THE STATE OF THE LAW: UNCHARGED
MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE IN SEX OFFENSE
CASES
The rule against character evidence prohibits the admission
of evidence in any form (opinion, reputation, or specific acts) to
show that a person possesses a particular character trait, if of-
fered to prove action in conformity with that trait. Thus, the
rule generally forbids the introduction of evidence that a defend-
ant, now charged with a sex offense, has also committed sex of-
fenses on other occasions. Courts often admit such evidence,
however, either on the ground that it is relevant for some pur-
pose other than to show the accused's character, or on the
ground that it falls within a recognized exception to the rule
against character evidence.
We begin our analysis by examining these theories of
admissibility.
A. UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT OFFERED AS CHARACTER
EVIDENCE UNDER AN EXCEPTION TO THE RULE OF
EXCLUSION
1. Impeachment of the defendant with prior convictions
If a defendant has been convicted of another sex crime, some
courts allow the prosecution to introduce evidence of the convic-
tion in order to impeach the defendant's testimony. When ad-
mitted for this purpose, the prior misconduct supposedly shows
that the defendant is the sort of person who would lie on the
witness stand, not that he is the type of person who would com-
mit rape. Accordingly, the defendant is entitled to a limiting in-
struction informing the jury that it should use this evidence only
for its bearing on his credibility, not as evidence of his guilt.14
14. For a typical instruction, see State v. Schwab, 409 N.W.2d 876, 882
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (Randall, J., concurring) (quoting 10 Minnesota Practice,
CRIM.JIG, 3.15(1) (1985)): "In the case of the defendant, you must be espe-
cially careful to consider any previous conviction only as it may affect his credi-
bility; you must not consider any previous conviction as evidence of guilt of the
offense for which he is on trial here."
Judge Randall, concurring specially in Schwab, made the following com-
ments on this instruction:
Problem: Is it reasonable and fair to assume that a jury will un-
derstand there is supposed to be a subtle difference between the ques-
tions "Is a defendant guilty?" and, "Is the defendant lying when he says
he is not guilty?" My perception and the perception, I believe, shared
by the trial bench, prosecutors and defense attorneys who work in the
area of criminal trials, is different. In reality, the evidence that the
defendant has committed the same crime in the past is so prejudicial
[Vol. 78:529
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In most jurisdictions, the trial judge has the authority to
prevent the use of other-crime convictions as impeachment evi-
dence in situations in which the jury is likely to use the evidence
improperly despite the limiting instruction. 15 One factor judges
consider in deciding this issue is the similarity of the other crime
to the charged crime.16 The greater the similarity, the greater
the danger that the jurors will treat the other crime as evidence
of a propensity to commit the charged crime, rather than limit-
ing their use of the evidence in the artificial way mandated by
the instruction. Thus, similarity is a factor that weighs against
admissibility when other crimes evidence is offered on an im-
peachment theory.
In contrast, similarity weighs in favor of admissibility if the
evidence is offered under the theory that it shows a plan or mo-
dus operandi, rather than a trait of character. If one takes this
web of doctrine seriously, a middle area may exist in which a
prior felony is too similar to be offered to impeach, but not simi-
lar enough to be offered for substantive purposes, and hence is
inadmissible. 17
One might suppose that judges often would exclude evi-
dence of a prior rape when offered on an impeachment theory in
a rape case, on the ground that the jury will draw the natural,
yet improper, inference that the evidence shows a tendency to
rape. Nevertheless, several appellate courts have upheld admis-
sion of a prior sex crime to impeach a defendant accused of rape
or another sex crime as being within the trial judge's
discretion.' 8
(read: substantive and credible) that the jury is apt to believe that he
has also committed this one.
Id. at 882.
15. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 609(a).
16. 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE T
609[04], at 609-54 to 609-55.
17. The middle area does not necessarily exist, however. The two catego-
ries conceivably border on each other (or overlap), so that when the felony is too
similar to be offered to impeach, it is invariably similar enough to be offered for
substantive purposes.
18. See State v. Trejo, 825 P.2d 1252 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, 828
P.2d 957 (N.M. 1992). In Trejo, the court held that an extrinsic conviction for
attempted criminal sexual penetration and kidnapping was admissible to im-
peach a defendant accused of the same crimes in a separate incident with a
separate victim. Id. at 1253-54. The court also held that the state could show
the defendant's dishonesty through his denial of the offense for which he was
convicted in the prior trial. Id. at 1256-57. In State v. Schwab, 409 N.W.2d at
876, the court held that it was not an error to deny the defendant's motion to
exclude a prior conviction for intrafamilial sexual abuse. Id. at 879. In the
charged crime, the defendant was accused of sexually abusing his girlfriend's
1994]
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The impeachment theory of admission verges on being a
transparent fiction. Few if any attorneys believe that juries ac-
tually follow the limiting instruction, or even understand it. In
addition, it is doubtful that the evidence has significant value
for its permitted purpose of determining credibility. It may be
true that a convicted rapist is generally more likely to lie than a
law-abiding person. When evidence is offered to impeach a de-
fendant who testifies in his own defense at trial, however, the
proposition that felons have a general propensity to lie is beside
the point. If the accused is in fact innocent, he presumably will
have no occasion to lie even if he is a dishonest person, as shown
by prior crimes. On the other hand, if he is guilty in fact, but
has pleaded not guilty and testified on his own behalf, he pre-
sumably will lie about the rape, even if he is a generally truthful
person and has no prior convictions. In either case, therefore,
his prior conviction is unhelpful to the jury except for the forbid-
den purpose of determining whether he has a propensity to rape.
If the accused is innocent of the crime at bar, then prior-
conviction impeachment defeats justice because it makes his de-
nial appear false when it is not. If the accused is guilty, then
prior-conviction impeachment still does not illuminate his truth-
fulness unless one assumes that a guilty person with a clean rec-
ord would be less likely to lie to obtain an acquittal. In view of
five-year-old son. Id. at 877. The court reasoned that the prior conviction "has
legitimate impeachment value" and that the trial judge was within discretion in
ruling that it would be admissible if the defendant testified. Id. at 878, 879. In
People v. Hall, 453 N.E. 2d 1327 (111. App. Ct. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1228
(1984), the court held that it was not an error to deny the defendant's motion to
exclude his prior conviction for rape when the defendant was accused of at-
tempted rape, armed robbery, and armed violence. Id. at 1330-31, 1335-37.
The conviction was admissible to impeach despite the similarity to the charged
crime. Id. at 1337. State v. Grubb, 541 N.E.2d 476 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988), held
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a sodomy conviction
from the 1940's to "impeach" the defendant charged with gross sexual imposi-
tion. Id. at 477-78. Jackson v. State, 447 N.W. 2d 430 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989),
held that in a prosecution for criminal sexual contact of a 14-year-old girl stay-
ing with the defendant's family, it was not an error to admit evidence of defend-
ant's prior conviction for sexual abuse of his daughter. Id. at 432, 433-34. The
court reasoned that the evidence served valid impeachment purposes because
the jury "had to choose to believe either [the defendant] or (the victim]." Id. at
434. But cf. United States v. Beahm, 664 F.2d 414 (4th Cir. 1981). In Beahm,
the court held that it was reversible error to admit prior convictions for sodomy
(11 years before the trial) and unnatural sexual practices (9.5 years before trial)
to impeach the defendant accused of child molestation. Id. at 417, 419. The
court based its decision on the prosecution's failure to specify why the convic-
tions were more probative than prejudicial, but indicated great doubt that they
could ever be admissible. Id. at 418, 419.
536
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the guilty defendant's strong incentive to lie on the stand, it is
doubtful that those with clean records are much more credible
than those with prior convictions.19
In short, the danger that the jury will use the evidence for
the powerful and appealing, but forbidden, inference that the de-
fendant has a tendency to rape outweighs its meager probative
value for the permitted inference that the defendant has a
greater-than-average propensity to lie. In any event, instructing
a jury to follow only the permitted thought-path is like telling
someone to ignore every flavor in an apple pie except the
cinnamon. 20
2. Impeachment of a testifying defendant by cross-
examination about sexual misconduct not resulting
in conviction
The trial judge also has discretion to permit impeachment of
a witness by cross-examination about witness misconduct that
reflects on the witness's truthfulness, even if the misconduct has
not resulted in a criminal conviction. 21 The attorney performing
cross-examination must "take the witness's answer" and may
not introduce extrinsic evidence of the uncharged misconduct. 22
Under the prevalent rule, the trial judge should sustain an ob-
jection to the cross-examination if the probative value of the evi-
dence on the issue of truthfulness is substantially outweighed by
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.2 3 As in impeachment
with prior convictions, uncharged sex offense evidence has little
value on the issue of whether the defendant, if guilty, would give
19. For a persuasive argument on this point, see Richard Friedman, Char-
acter Impeachment Evidence: Psycho-Bayesian [I?] Analysis and A Proposed
Overhaul, 38 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 637, 655-64 (1991).
20. For an example of a social science study indicating that the limiting
instruction does not function properly, see Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks,
On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior Conviction
Evidence to Decide on Guilt, 9 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 37 (1985).
21. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 608. Rule 608 codified the common law rule that
prevailed in a number ofjurisdictions. 3A JoHN HENRY WiGMORE, EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAw, § 982 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). Wigmore reported that a
minority of courts at common law restricted impeachment evidence to evidence
of misconduct that indicated "a lack of veracity-fraud, forgery, perjury, and
the like." Id. (emphasis omitted). Other jurisdictions allowed cross-examina-
tion as to "any kind of misconduct, as indicating general bad character... thus,
a robbery or an assault or an adultery may be used, although none of these
directly indicates an impairment of the trait of veracity." Id. (emphasis
omitted).
22. FED. R. Evm. 608; 3A WIGMORE, supra note 21, §§ 979, 986.
23. FED. R. Evm. 403.
1994]
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false testimony. Courts which adhere to the rule against pro-
pensity evidence should therefore exclude this evidence because
of the danger that the jury will misuse it.24
3. Rebuttal of defense character evidence and cross-
examination of defense character witnesses
Under an exception to the rule against character evidence,
the defendant may offer exculpatory reputation or opinion testi-
mony25 by character witnesses, but is not entitled to offer evi-
dence of specific acts, such as occasions on which he behaved
properly towards women. 26 If a defendant presents a character
witness who gives reputation or opinion testimony that the de-
fendant is peaceable, law-abiding, respectful to women, or the
like, the prosecutor may rebut this evidence with character wit-
nesses who offer reputation or opinion evidence to the contrary.
More potently, the prosecutor, with a good faith basis, may
cross-examine the defendant's character witness by asking
whether the witness has heard that the defendant had commit-
ted specific bad acts on other occasions.27 The standard justifi-
cation of this type of question is that the evidence impeaches the
character witness by showing either that the witness does not
know of the defendant's true reputation or that the witness has
24. For a representative case holding that it is error to allow cross-exami-
nation about prior sex offenses on an impeachment theory, see State v. Clem-
mons, 353 S.E.2d 209 (N.C. 1987). In Clemmons, the court held that it was
error, though harmless, to allow cross-examination of a rape defendant about
his prior attempted rape of another woman. Id. at 210, 212-13. The court held
that the trial judge's theory that the evidence was admissible to impeach the
defendant's testimony under Rule 608 was invalid because the evidence was not
probative of the defendant's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. Id. at
213. State v. Scott, 347 S.E.2d 414 (N.C. 1986), held that in the prosecution of
the defendant for child molestation, the trial judge committed reversible error
by allowing cross-examination of the defendant about other acts of sexual mis-
conduct. Id. at 415, 417. The court reasoned that a Rule 608(b) theory failed
because the evidence was not sufficiently probative of truthfulness. Id. at 417-
18. Summerlin v. State, 643 S.W.2d 582 (Ark. Ct. App. 1982), held that in the
prosecution of the defendant for sexual contact with a young boy, cross-exami-
nation concerning the defendant's discharge from the Navy for the same type of
sexual activity as the charged offense constituted reversible error. Id. at 583,
584-85. A Rule 608 theory of admission failed because the evidence was not
probative of truthfulness. Id. at 584-85.
25. Common law jurisdictions usually allowed reputation testimony, but
not opinion testimony. See 3A WiGMORE, supra note 21, § 921; FED. R. EvID.
405(a) advisory committee's note. The Federal Rules of Evidence allow proof in
either form. FED. R. EvrD. 405(a).
26. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 405(a).
27. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 479 (1948).
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an unusual definition of a good reputation.28 Because the ad-
verse impact of this cross-examination typically would outweigh
the benefit to the defendant from the character testimony, a
competent defense counsel will rarely offer character evidence in
sex offense cases if any evidence exists of other misconduct by
the defendant.
4. Curative admissibility
If a defendant asserts that he has never been involved in
similar incidents or otherwise conveys to the jury inadmissible
denials of similar conduct, the prosecution may rebut by offering
relevant evidence of uncharged misconduct. In such a case, the
defendant's evidence is inadmissible because the exception per-
mitting the defense to offer character evidence covers only repu-
tation and opinion testimony, not testimony about the
defendant's conduct.29 In this situation, the prosecution "fights
fire with fire"30 by introducing evidence that would otherwise be
inadmissible.
State v. Banks31 illustrates this principle in the context of
sex crimes. The defendant in Banks was charged with a sex
crime against his daughter, a girl of less than 13 years of age.3 2
When his lawyer questioned him about the charges, he re-
sponded with broad denials of any sexual conduct with chil-
dren.3 3 For example, he said, "There is no truth to that, I
haven't, never in my entire life ever had sex with any child, with
any person that was not of legal age and without their con-
sent."34 He also called a former girlfriend to the stand to testify
that his sexual behavior was normal and that she had never
28. Id. at 479, 483. See also FED. R. Evm. 405(a) advisory committee's
note.
29. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 405(a).
30. For a useful discussion of fighting fire with fire, see MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE, supra note 1, § 57, at 84. The authors conclude that in situations in
which the adversary made a timely objection to the inadmissible evidence and
the inadmissible evidence was damaging, the adversary should be entitled to
give answering evidence as a matter of right. Id. The adversary also should be
entitled to put in answering evidence as a matter of right in situations in which
the inadmissible evidence, or the question asking about it, was so prejudice-
arousing that an objection would not have erased the harm. Id. In other situa-
tions, the authors conclude, the trial judge should have discretion whether to
allow the answering evidence.
31. 593 N.E.2d 346 (Ohio App. 3d 1991).
32. Id. at 347.
33. Id. at 347-48.
34. Id. at 347.
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known him to engage in sexual conduct with children.35 The
Ohio Court of Appeals ruled that such testimony entitled the
prosecution to submit evidence about the defendant's sexual
misconduct with other children.36
B. UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT OFFERED FOR REASONS OTHER
THAN SHOWING CHARACTER: RULE 404(b) EVIDENCE
The character evidence rule does not prohibit uncharged
misconduct evidence per se; rather, it prohibits a certain type of
reasoning about such evidence: an inference of bad character
from bad acts, and then an inference of guilt of the crime
charged from the bad character.3 7 Uncharged misconduct is ad-
missible, subject to balancing for prejudice, when it is offered for
a purpose that does not require such character reasoning. Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides examples of permissible
purposes, such as showing knowledge, identity, plan, prepara-
tion, opportunity, motive, intent, or absence of mistake or
accident.38
35. Id. at 347-48.
36. In the case before us, the defendant, in his case-in-chief, inter-
jected the issue of his prior sexual acts into the case. Consequently, as
the defendant elected to rely upon the absence of prior acts of sexual
misconduct or "perversion" as a defense in his case-in-chief, the state
was entitled to introduce testimony in rebuttal to meet the defense in-
terposed by the defendant.
Id. at 349. Accord State v. Sonnenberg, 344 N.W.2d 95, 97 (Wis. 1984) (holding
that in a prosecution for child molestation, defendant "opened the door" to
cross-examination about his propositioning an adult woman ten days before
trial when he testified that he never sought sexual satisfaction outside of his
marriage); Quimby v. State, 604 So.2d 741 (Miss. 1992). In Quimby, the de-
fendant "blurted out" on direct examination, "I have never abused my daughter
or any other child ever in any way, shape, form or fashion." Id. at 745. The
court held that this assertion opened the door to specific act evidence about
prior sexual abuse of his daughter. Id. at 746. Many states would admit the
Quimby evidence on the ground that it shows a "motive" arising from a lust for
the particular victim. See infra note 45; see also State v. Anderson, 686 P.2d
193 (Mont. 1984). In Anderson, the defendant offered an amalgam of evidence
that included opinion testimony as to character, reputation evidence, and broad
denials of specific acts. Id. at 203-04. He offered testimony about his reputa-
tion for "morality and personal truthfulness"; his wife testified that he had "or-
thodoxk " sexual mores and that the charges did not comport with her knowledge
of him; and he denied improper sexual conduct with the alleged victims or with
anyone else. Id. at 204. The Montana Supreme Court approved admission of
counter-evidence in the form of testimony by a young girl that she had slept
with the defendant while he was naked. Id. at 203.
37. 1A JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 55,
at 1160-61 (Tillers rev. ed. 1983) [hereinafter WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE].
38. See infra note 115.
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Courts have no difficulty applying this rule when it is plain
that the trier of fact need not make any inference about disposi-
tion or propensity. Suppose, for example, that the defendant is
accused of growing marijuana in his backyard. He claims that
he thought that the plants were just ordinary weeds. To show
the defendant's knowledge that they were marijuana, the judge
would allow the prosecutor to put in evidence that the defendant
had previously been convicted of growing marijuana. In such a
case, the purpose of the evidence would be to show that the de-
fendant knew what marijuana looked like, not that he is a drug
dealer. In this example, the evidence does not require an infer-
ence about any personality disposition of the defendant,
although the jury is likely to make one.39
Unlike the marijuana hypothetical, permissible uses of un-
charged misconduct evidence under Rule 404(b) usually do in-
volve, to some degree, an inference about a propensity of the
defendant to act similarly in similar situations. Consequently,
it is often difficult to determine whether to admit the evidence.
We now examine the four permissible uses specifically listed in
Rule 404(b) that commonly arise in sex crime cases: "motive,"
"intent/absence of mistake," "plan," and "identity."
1. Motive
"Motive" evidence reveals the state of mind or emotion that
influenced the defendant to desire the result of the charged
crime.40 Uncharged misconduct evidence can show motive in
39. In an article that describes practically all 404(b) evidence as propensity
evidence, Professor Kuhns characterizes evidence offered to show knowledge as
propensity evidence on the ground that it depends on the inference that "[a]
person who has obtained knowledge of some fact has a propensity to retain that
knowledge." Richard B. Kuhns, The Propensity to Misunderstand the Character
of Specific Acts Evidence, 66 IowA L. REV. 777, 790 (1981). Knowledge evidence
does not require, however, that the trier assume that the defendant has an indi-
vidualized propensity that marks him as different from humanity in general.
Use of inferences that the defendant shares the capacities of human beings in
general does not raise the dangers of prejudice at which the character evidence
rule is aimed. In the context of character evidence discussions, the term "pro-
pensity" probably refers to individualized traits rather than capacities, such as
memory, that are almost universally shared.
40. For a similar definition of motive, see CHARLES A. WIGHT & KENNETH
W. GRAHAM, 22 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5240, at 479 (1980):
"'[Miotive' is... an emotion or state of mind that prompts a person to act in a
particular way." See also WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 37, § 117; JOHN
HENRY WIGMORE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF As GIVEN BY LOGIC, PsY-
CHOLOGY, AND GENERAL EXPERIENCE AND ILLUSTRATED IN JUDICIAL TRIALS § 69,
at 14647 (3d ed. 1937) [hereinafter WIGMORE, PROOF].
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either of two ways. 41 First, the uncharged misconduct can cause
the motive to arise. For example, suppose that the uncharged
crime is robbery and the charged crime is murder. The prosecu-
tion's theory is that the defendant murdered the victim because
the victim witnessed the robbery. Thus, the robbery gave rise to
the motive for the murder. Admission of this uncharged miscon-
duct evidence does not require the trier to infer that the defend-
ant has a violent character but only that he had a reason to
commit the charged crime.
Second, the uncharged misconduct can be offered as evi-
dence of a pre-existing motive that caused both the uncharged
act and the charged crime. For example, suppose that the de-
fendant is charged with the murder of Mr. X. On a prior occa-
sion, the defendant vandalized Mr. X's car. The vandalism
would be admissible on the theory that it manifests animosity
toward Mr. X, and that the animosity was the motive for the
murder.42
Commentators have criticized the reception of this second
type of motive evidence on the ground that it amounts to propen-
sity evidence. 43 The evidence, however, does not plainly violate
the rule against using character to prove conduct. To say that
Jones hates Smith is not necessarily to say that Jones has the
character of being a hater. The word "character" connotes an
enduring general propensity, as opposed to a situationally spe-
cific emotion.44 Besides, the genuine probative value of the evi-
41. See EDWARD J. IMWINKELREID, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE
§ 3:15 (1984). Cf 22 WaIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 40, § 5140, at 481 (1978)
("First, the other act can be one that caused the mental state [that provides the
motive]; for example, a desire for revenge against witnesses produced by a prior
conviction. Second, the other act may be offered as another consequence of the
same emotion, as when proof that the defendant stole from his wives is offered
to show motive for bigamy.").
42. See, e.g., State v. Green, 652 P.2d 697, 701 (Kan. 1982) (holding that
the defendant's prior assaults on his wife were admissible to show the defend-
ant's motive for murdering her).
43. RICHARD 0. LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH
TO EVIDENCE 226 (2d ed. 1982).
44. Cf WIGMORE, PROOF, supra note 40.
Under Character are here included any and every quality or ten-
dency of a person's mind, existing originally or developed from his na-
tive substance, and more or less permanent in their existence.
Character is thus contrasted with Habit, a quality or tendency later
formed from time to time, but not permanent; and with Emotion or
Design, a condition having only a temporary existence.
Id. at 103.
The concept of character as an enduring, cross-situational propensity is
consistent with the purposes of the character rule. The danger that the jury
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dence that the defendant hates X is usually much greater than
the value of evidence that he is a hater in general.
In child sexual abuse cases, courts often admit evidence
that the defendant previously abused the same child to show
that he was motivated by a lustful desire for that particular
child.45 This use of motive evidence in sex crime cases is analo-
gous to the use of vandalism in the previous example to show the
defendant's hatred for Mr. X. Sometimes, however, courts have
given the motive concept astonishing breadth in child sex abuse
cases. For example, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that evi-
dence of uncharged acts against other adolescent girls was ad-
missible in a sex crime case on the ground that the evidence
showed the defendant's motive "to gratify lustful desire by grab-
bing or fondling young girls ... . 46 That reasoning is compara-
ble to saying, in a burglary case, that other acts of thievery show
a "desire to satisfy the [defendant's] greedy nature by grabbing
other people's belongings."47 In either case, a trait of character
supplies the motive, and so nothing is left of the rule against
character reasoning.
Courts appear more willing to admit this type of "motive"
evidence in child sexual abuse cases48 than in adult rape
will give the conduct too much weight is reduced when the conduct is situation-
ally specific because situationally specific conduct is in fact more likely to be
consistently repeated. See infra text accompanying notes 146-52. The danger
of punishing the defendant for the uncharged acts is less severe when the jury
is being asked to infer not a consistent prolonged tendency, but rather, a tempo-
rary emotion.
45. See Padgett v. State, 551 So.2d 1259 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (holding
that evidence of the defendant's prior sexual assaults against the victim was
admissible to show his "lustful attitude" toward the victim); State v. Scott, 828
P.2d 958, 961 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that evidence of the defendant's
repeated fondling and sexual intercourse with the victim for ten years prior to
the charged crime was properly admitted to show the defendant's "lewd and
lascivious" disposition towards the victim); State v. Ferguson, 667 P.2d 68, 71
(Wash. 1983) (en banc) (holding that evidence of photographs showing that the
defendant made the child victim put her mouth on his penis was admissible to
prove a lustful disposition towards the child).
46. State v. Schlak, 111 N.W.2d 289, 292 (Iowa 1961) (stating in dicta that
the conviction was reversed because the trial judge admitted the act was too
remote in time).
47. See LEMPERT & SALTZBRG, supra note 43, at 230.
48. See State v. Friedrich, 398 N.W.2d 763 (Wis. 1987). In Friedrich, the
defendant raised an alibi defense in response to a charge of sexual contact with
his 14-year-old niece. Id. at 766. He claimed that he was working at the time of
the charged acts. Id. at 766. Prior sexual touching of the victim and of another
young girl was admissible to show the motive of obtaining sexual gratification,
which is an element of the offense. Id. at 772. Alternatively, the evidence was
admissible to show a plan because the defendant was involved in a system of
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cases. 49 In neither type of case, however, is there a need to ex-
plain the accused's motive. Motive is not a mystery in a sex
crime case as it sometimes is in other crimes, such as murder.
Courts that admit the evidence of acts against third parties on a
motive theory are really using "motive" as a euphemism for
character.
2. Identity
Proof of "identity" is one of the permissible purposes listed
in Rule 404(b), but uncharged misconduct evidence is not auto-
matically admissible when the perpetrator's identity is in is-
sue.50 The evidence must show that the defendant committed
other crimes using the same modus operandi as the perpetrator
of the charged crime. Courts often say that the modus must be
criminal activity by seeking sexual gratification from young girls with whom he
had a familial or quasi-familial relationship. Id. at 773. In Elliott v. State, 600
P.2d 1044 (Wyo. 1979), the court held that the prior acts of child sexual abuse
were admissible to show "motive". Id. at 1048. In United States v. Herbert, 35
M.J. 266 (C.M.A. 1992), the criminal charge arose from the defendant's alleged
act of oral sex with his adolescent stepson. Id. at 267. The court held that it
was not an abuse of discretion to admit evidence of the defendant's attempt to
fondle one nephew and to have oral sex with another. Id. at 268. The court
reasoned that even though a showing of desire for sexual gratification is not an
element of the charged crime,
[e]vidence of a specific state of mind on the part of an accused on occa-
sions prior to charged acts may be admissible to show circumstantially
that the charged acts later occurred as an expression of or outlet for
this mental state .... Here, the [defendant's] nephews testified to his
sexual acts or attempted sexual acts with both of them which indicated
his peculiar incestual interest for young boy family members.
Id.
49. See, e.g., People v. Tassell, 679 P.2d 1, 3-4 (Cal. 1984) (en banc) (holding
that prior rapes were inadmissible and noting that the prosecution did not pur-
sue a motive theory); State v. Saltarelli, 655 P.2d 697, 700 (Wash. 1982) (en
banc) ("[Ilt is by no means clear how an assault on a woman could be a motive
or inducement for defendants rape of a different woman almost five years later
.... [Tihe evidence seems to achieve no more than to show a general propensity
to rape, precisely forbidden by [Evidence Rule] 404(b)."). But see Carey v. State,
715 P.2d 244, 249 (Wyo. 1986) (holding that uncharged misconduct was admis-
sible in an adult rape case and observing that, as an alternative ground, the
evidence showed that the defendant had "something within him" that moti-
vated him to use force to achieve sexual gratification), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882
(1986).
50. "[Tlhe need to prove identity should not be, in itself, a ticket to admis-
sion. Almost always, identity is the inference that flows from... [other] theo-
ries .... [L]arger plan .... distinctive device .... and motive seem to be most
often relied upon to show identity." MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 1,
§ 190, at 808.
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like a "signature" or even that it must be "unique,"51 but many
decisions have required less.52 For example, in a robbery case,
the Arizona Supreme Court admitted evidence of prior robberies
even though the only similarity between the uncharged crimes
and the charged crime was that they all involved similar conven-
ience stores.53
As a rule, identity is in dispute in stranger rape cases, but
not in acquaintance rape cases,5 4 leading some courts to hold
that modus evidence is not admissible in acquaintance rape
(consent defense) cases.55 This reasoning can result in exclusion
even in situations when the uncharged misconduct and the
charged acts are substantially similar. For example, in People v.
51. "M[Courts use a variety of terms to describe the criteria needed to in-
voke the modus operandi theory, including 'distinguishing,' 'handiwork,' 're-
markably similar,' 'idiosyncratic,' 'signature quality,' and 'unique.'" John E.B.
Myers, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in Child Abuse Litigation, 1988 UTAH
L. REv. 479, 550 (citing relevant cases).
52. See generally I Ir aKELRm, supra note 41, § 3:13 (discussing relevant
cases).
53. State v. Smith, 707 P.2d 289, 297 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc); cf. People v.
Massey, 16 Cal. Rptr. 402 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (admitting evidence of similar
burglary even though the similarities were hardly enough to justify an analogy
to a "signature").
54. Although these generalizations nearly always hold true, the lines be-
tween stranger rapes (with an alibi defense) and acquaintance rapes (with a
consent defense) are occasionally blurred. For example, in a recent case, the
defendant, who claimed to know the victim, entered the victim's apartment sur-
reptitiously, raped her at knife-point, and argued at trial that the sex was con-
sensual because she asked him to use a condom. The jury rejected this
argument. See Rapist Who Agreed to Use Condom Gets 40 Years, N.Y. TnzEs,
May 15, 1993, at 6; Roy Bragg, Condom Rape Suspect-Fear Made Him Pull the
Knife, HOUSTON CHRON., November 25, 1992, at 19. One can imagine a rapist
who was an admitted stranger telling a similar story. It is also conceivable that
an "acquaintance" who had met the victim briefly on a prior occasion might
claim, when charged with rape, that he had been misidentified.
55. See, e.g., United States v. Ferguson, 28 M.J. 104 (C.M.A. 1989) (alter-
native holding) (holding that when a defendant was charged with sexual abuse
of one adolescent stepdaughter, testimony of another stepdaughter about simi-
lar abuse was not admissible to show modus operandi because identity of the
perpetrator was not in dispute); Velez v. State, 762 P.2d 1297 (Alaska Ct. App.
1988) (holding that it was error to admit modus evidence in a consent defense
case because identity was not in issue); People v. Tassell, 679 P.2d 1, 3-4 (Cal.
1984) (en banc) (holding that a prior rape was inadmissible in a consent defense
case and that modus evidence was not admissible unless identity was in issue);
People v. Barbour, 436 N.E.2d 667, 672-73 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (holding that
modus evidence was not admissible in consent defense cases because there was
no issue of identity). But see State v. Willis, 370 N.W.2d 193, 198 (S.D. 1985)
(overruling a prior case in which modus evidence was not admissible because
identity was not in issue and holding instead that modus evidence was admissi-
ble in a consent defense case as showing intent and plan).
19941
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Tassell,56 the California Supreme Court concluded that the trial
court erroneously admitted evidence, in a consent defense case,
that the defendant had committed two other rapes. 57 According
to the state's evidence, the victim was a waitress who had given
the defendant a ride home after she finished work.58 The de-
fendant forced her to drive to another location and then raped
her in her van.5 9 In several respects, the rape at issue closely
resembled the uncharged rapes. All took place in vehicles, and
involved the use of a similar thumbs-against-windpipe choke
hold.60 In one uncharged incident, the rapist even used the
same false first name as that used by the defendant in the
charged incident.61 Holding that the trial court should have ex-
cluded the evidence, the court remarked that, "[tihere being no
issue of identity, it is immaterial whether the modus operandi of
the charged crime was similar to that of the uncharged
offenses."62
3. Plan
Under Rule 404(b), evidence of uncharged misconduct is
also admissible to prove "plan." Such evidence is consistent with
the general rule against character evidence. Inferring that a de-
fendant had a plan is different from inferring that he has a char-
acter trait.
The concept of "plan," however, is as protean as the concept
of "motive." 'Plan" can refer to a plan conceived by the defend-
ant in which the commission of the uncharged crime is a means
by which the defendant prepares for the commission of another
crime, as in Wigmore's example of stealing a key in order to rob
a safe.6 3 Plan can also refer to a pattern of crime, envisioned by
the defendant as a coherent whole, in which he achieves an ulti-
mate goal through a series of related crimes. For example, in
the movie Kind Hearts and Coronets,64 Alec Guinness plotted to
acquire a title by killing off everyone with a superior claim.
Each of the bizarre killings was different, but each was in pur-
suit of the same plan. This use of uncharged misconduct evi-
56. 679 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1984) (en banc).
57. Id. at 8.
58. Id. at 2.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 3.
62. Id. at 8.
63. WiGMORE, supra note 21, § 218, at 1883.
64. KIND HEARTS & CORONETS (Ealing Studios, 1949).
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dence to show multi-crime plans whose parts are linked in the
planner's mind is not controversial. 65
The concept "plan," and its frequent companion "common
scheme," sometimes refers to a pattern of conduct, not envi-
sioned by the defendant as a coherent whole, in which he repeat-
edly achieves similar results by similar methods.66 These plans
could be called "unlinked" plans. The defendant never pictures
all the crimes at once, but rather plans a crime thinking, "It
worked before, I'll try the same plan again." Some commenta-
tors have criticized courts for admitting such "spurious plan" ev-
idence.6 7 In a California acquaintance rape case, for example,
the court described "common scheme or plan" as merely an unac-
ceptable euphemism for "disposition."68
Yet this concept of "plan" is a textually plausible interpreta-
tion of the rule against character reasoning. One could construe
the concept of "character" as referring only to traits manifesting
a general propensity, such as a propensity toward violence or
dishonesty. Under this interpretation, a situationally specific
propensity, such as a propensity to lurk in the back seats of
empty cars in shopping centers as a prelude to sexual assaults
on the owners,6 9 would be too specific to be called a trait of char-
65. See also State v. Wallace, 431 A.2d 613 (Me. 1981). In Wallace, the
defendant had a plan to reconstitute a gun collection previously owned by his
father. Id. at 615. The court held that evidence of an uncharged burglary in
which one gun was recaptured was admissible to show the defendant's involve-
ment in the charged burglary in which another gun was recaptured. Id. at 616.
66. "In effect, these courts convert the doctrine into a plan-to-commit-a-se-
ries-of-similar-crimes theory." IwnnE m, supra note 41, § 3:23. For exam-
ple, the prosecution used this approach in a case in which the court admitted
prior acts of accepting kickbacks from third parties to show a "common scheme"
to use one's position to acquire kickbacks. Commonwealth v. Schoening, 396
N.E.2d 1004, 1009 (Mass. 1979). In Schoening, the court held that evidence
that the defendant took kickbacks on two other occasions, even if from a differ-
ent party, is admissible to show motive, plan, or common scheme: "[t]he defend-
ant's use of his position to guarantee contracts to particular firms and thus to
guarantee kickbacks to himself provided the common or general scheme under-
lying all three transactions." Id. But see United States v. O'Connor, 580 F.2d
38, 42 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that bribes taken from third parties are not suffi-
ciently probative of a "definite project" of committing the present crime).
67. See Note, Admissibility of Similar Crimes, 1901-51, 18 BRoom L. REV.
80, 104-05 (1951) (labelling the category "spurious common scheme or plan");
ImINKELRE D, supra note 41, § 3:23 (noting that "commentators have been al-
most uniformly critical of the [spurious plan] doctrine" and stating that "[tiheir
criticism is well-founded").
68. People v. Tassell, 679 P.2d 1, 4-5 (Cal. 1984) (en banc).
69. See Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847
(1959).
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acter. The probative value of the evidence is, of course, en-
hanced by the situational similarity.
In other contexts, courts have accepted evidence of situa-
tionally specific propensities despite the rule against character
reasoning. Evidence of "habit"70 and of "modus operandi" to
show identity7' are examples of evidence that requires propen-
sity reasoning, but is not regarded as character evidence. Thus,
liberal admission of evidence of unlinked plans does not actually
break new ground.
In sex crime cases, the "plan" concept is usually used in its
broadest sense. One rarely finds linked-plan sex crime cases in
which the defendant conceived of one continuous plan and car-
ried it out. To be sure, a defendant's initial acts of kissing or
fondling a child might be considered part of an overall plan to
have invasive sex.72 Usually, however, the sex crime "plans" are
unlinked or "spurious": the defendant repeatedly commits the
same crime with the same technique and objective, and only in
that sense follows the same "plan" or "scheme."73
70. See FED. R. EvID. 406.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 50-52.
72. See State v. Paille, 601 So. 2d 1321, 1323 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)
("The fact that the incidents began with kissing and continued over a period of
three months is relevant to prove that Paille planned and intended to lure the
victim into sexual activity over time. We believe this is relevance beyond mere
propensity.").
73. E.g., People v. Oliphant, 250 N.W.2d 443 (Mich. 1976); State v. Fried-
rich, 398 N.W.2d 763, 772-773 (Wis. 1987) ("The defendant was involved in a
system of criminal activity in seeking sexual gratification from young girls with
whom he had a familial or quasi-familial relationship."). In Oliphant, the court
upheld the admission of three uncharged rapes in a consent defense case rea-
soning that "(tihe many similarities in all four cases tend to show a plan and
scheme to orchestrate the events surrounding the rape of complainant so that
she could not show non-consent and the defendant could thereby escape punish-
ment. The defendant's plan made it appear that an ordinary social encounter
which culminated in voluntary sex had simply gone sour at the denouement due
to his reference to complainant's unpleasant body odor." Oliphant, 250 N.W.2d
at 449. But see United States v. Rappaport, 22 M.J. 445, 447 (C.M.A. 1986)
(holding that, in a case in which a psychologist was accused of sexual affairs
with patients, evidence of an uncharged affair with another patient was not
admissible because "[e]vidence that the accused previously had a similar affair
with one of his patients did not tend to establish a plan or overall scheme of
which the charged offenses were part"); People v. Tassell, 679 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1984)
(en banc) (holding that evidence of the defendant's uncharged sex offenses was
inadmissible when no issue of identity existed); Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726, 733
(Del. 1988) (holding that "[tlhe evidence of prior sexual contact [between the
defendant and his daughter, the victim] in this case, even if it had adhered to
the State's proffer, involved two other isolated events within the previous two
years depicting no common plan other than multiple instances of sexual
gratification.").
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Courts have sometimes employed the "plan" theory to jus-
tify admission of evidence of prior rapes in consent defense
cases. For example, in People v. Oliphant,74 the Supreme Court
of Michigan used an unlinked plan theory to uphold reception of
evidence against a defendant who repeatedly employed an unu-
sual rape scheme.75 In Oliphant, the defendant met the victim
while she was window-shopping. 76 After a friendly chat, they
visited several bars.7 7 He then took her to an isolated place and
raped her.78 Charged with rape and gross indecency, Oliphant
relied on a consent defense.79 At trial, the court permitted the
prosecution to submit evidence of three prior rapes by Oliphant,
including two of which he had been acquitted.8 0
The Michigan Supreme Court held that the trial court prop-
erly admitted evidence of the prior rapes to show a common plan
in which the defendant orchestrated circumstances so that if his
sexual advances met resistance he would rape the woman, but
cause the encounter to appear consensual. 81 All four attacks oc-
curred during a five-month period and involved college-age wo-
men; all began with a friendly, introductory conversation in
Commentators have noted that in sex crime prosecutions, some courts give
prosecutors greater latitude under the "spurious" plan rubric than in other
kinds of crimes. See James M.H. Gregg, Other Acts of Sexual Misbehavior and
Perversion as Evidence in Prosecutions for Sexual Offenses, 6 ARiz. L. REv. 212,
230 (1965); IrixvmLPID, supra note 41, § 4:13, at 36 n.4; Myers, supra note
51, at 544 n.220 (citing State v. Bennett, 672 P.2d 772 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983)(noting plan to harbor and abuse runaway girls)); Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d
1036 (Wyo. 1987) (noting plan to gain confidence of volleyball team members
coached by the defendant, and then molest them); State v. Moore, 819 P.2d
1143 (Idaho 1991). In Moore, the defendant was charged with sexual abuse of
his granddaughter. Id. at 1143. Prior acts of abuse by the defendant of his
daughter when she was aged nine through thirteen and his stepdaughter when
she was aged eight and nine were admissible. Id. at 1147. A common scheme
was shown by "a continuing series of alleged similar sexual encounters directed
at the young female children living within [the accused's] household." Id. at
1149.
74. 250 N.W.2d 443, 450 (Mich. 1976).
75. Oliphant subsequently petitioned for habeas corpus in federal court,
claiming a double jeopardy violation because the State had tried him for two of
the prior crimes with both trials resulting in acquittal. The petition was de-
nied. Oliphant v. Koehier, 594 F.2d 547, 550 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
877 (1979).
76. Oliphant v. Koehler, 594 F.2d at 548.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 549.
80. The Sixth Circuit held this was not a violation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause. Id. at 556.




public, involving discussions of race and marijuana; all victims
willingly entered the defendant's car; invariably the defendant
deviated from the expected route, offering an excuse that did not
arouse fear in the victim; the rapes did not involve much physi-
cal force; the defendant did not rip the victim's clothing; and he
took each victim to an unfamiliar place for intercourse.8 2 In ad-
dition, the defendant attempted to weaken his victims' credibil-
ity by providing them with or insisting that they remember his
name, address, college identification card, and license plate
number.83 None of the victims had sustained serious physical
injuries and they all had many opportunities to escape during
the encounters.8 4
The court concluded that evidence of this plan was relevant
to the issue of consent.8 5 In the charged crime, the defendant's
plan made it appear that an ordinary social encounter culminat-
ing in consensual sex simply went sour after the defendant com-
plained about the woman's body odor.8 6 Thus, in Oliphant the
absence of an identity issue did not preclude evidence of a simi-
lar modus operandi. Rather than characterizing the case as one
in which the prosecution proved identity by a similar modus, the
court allowed the prosecution to refute the consent defense by
showing that the defendant had a "plan or scheme to orchestrate
the events surrounding the rape . . . so that [the victim] could
not show non-consent."8 7
People v. Tassels" exemplifies a narrower definition of the
concept of "plan." In Tassel, the defendant had committed three
rapes, using a similar scheme for each crime.8 9 The Supreme
Court of California considered and rejected the "plan" theory.90
It held that there must be a "'single conception or plot' of which
the charged and uncharged crimes are individual manifesta-
tions," and that "[aibsent such a 'grand design,' talk of a 'com-
mon plan or scheme' is really nothing but the bestowing of a
82. Oliphant v. Koehler, 594 F.2d at 550-52.




87. People v. Oliphant, 250 N.W.2d at 449; see also State v. Valdez, 534
P.2d 449, 452 (1975) (holding that an uncharged rape is admissible to show
common plan when in both cases the defendant was acquainted with the victim,
went to the victim's residence in the early-morning hours on the pretense of
looking for someone, and both rapes involved a "sexual tour-de-force").
88. 679 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1984) (en banc).
89. Id. at 3.
90. Id. at 4.
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respectable label on a disreputable basis for admissibility - the
defendant's disposition."91
4. Intent/absence of mistake or accident
Many courts liberally admit uncharged misconduct evidence
to show intent or absence of mistake or accident. For these pur-
poses, they have required less of a showing of similarity than
when evidence is offered to show motive, identity, or plan.92
The prosecution can sometimes prove intent by introducing
uncharged misconduct evidence without relying on any infer-
ence of a propensity for misconduct. For example, in a murder
case, if the defendant bludgeoned a guard on the way to killing
the victim, the uncharged misconduct of assaulting the guard
would tend to show that the subsequent murder was premedi-
tated. To reach this conclusion, one need not infer that the de-
fendant has a general propensity to assault people.
In most cases, however, the inference of intent depends on
an underlying inference that the defendant has a propensity to
commit the crime. This is true even in frequently-cited exam-
ples of the intentmistake concept, such as when the court, to
show that the defendant had guilty intent when he bought sto-
len goods on the occasion charged, admits evidence that he had
previously bought stolen goods.93 The prosecution seeks to cre-
ate an inference that because the defendant has a continuing
propensity to buy stolen goods, he had the forbidden intent on
the occasion in question.
Although proof of intent almost always involves proof of pro-
pensity, this does not necessarily mean that admission of such
evidence wholly extinguishes the rule against character reason-
ing. When the evidence is offered to show intent, many courts
require a special degree of similarity between the acts.94 For
example, in a prosecution for receiving stolen goods, the prosecu-
tor may not show intent by evidence of a general propensity to
be dishonest. A propensity to deal in stolen goods, by contrast,
91. Id. at 4-5.
92. 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 40, § 5240, at 482 ("Courts seem to
be more willing to assume that one mental state will generate another than
they are to infer that it will produce action.").
93. See, e.g., Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 683, 685 (1988)
(holding that in a prosecution for selling stolen goods, evidence of prior "similar
acts" is admissible to show that defendant knew the goods he sold were stolen if
such evidence is sufficient to allow the jury to find that the defendant commit-
ted the act).
94. 22 WRIGHT & GRuIAzu, supra note 40, § 5242, at 490-91.
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would be narrow enough. In general, the degree of similarity
required to permit use of uncharged misconduct evidence to
show intent is less than when the ultimate fact sought to be
shown is the doing of the criminal act. Perhaps lack of intent
should be regarded as a disfavored defense because it is open to
rebuttal by evidence that the court otherwise would have
excluded.
The main limitation on the intent exception-at least in sex
crime cases-is that intent must actually be in issue. In many
sex crime cases, intent is plainly in issue. This is so when, for
example, the criminal sexual contact involves the defendant
touching intimate parts of the victim and the defendant claims
that the touching was accidental or that it was for a nonsexual
purpose, such as bathing or giving medical treatment to a
child.95 The prosecutor then can introduce uncharged acts of the
defendant to show that he intended to derive sexual gratification
from the touching.
In other sex crime cases, however, the defendant denies that
the act took place and makes no claim about intent. Courts
sometimes admit the evidence anyway, especially in child abuse
cases. For example, in United States v. Hadley,96 the defendant,
a teacher, was accused of sexually abusing young boys who were
his students.97 After two students, aged nine and eleven, had
95. See, e.g., United States v. Beahm, 664 F.2d 414, 417 (4th Cir. 1981)
(affirming the lower court's admission of evidence of molestation of another
child to show intent when the defense counsel argued that the government had
the burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the touching at issue
was not accidental); State v. Wermerskirchen, 497 N.W.2d 235, 236, 243 (Minn.
1993) (holding that when the defendant denies the act of touching a child's inti-
mate parts, the court should instruct the jury that evidence of uncharged sexual
touching of others is admissible to show intent). But cf People v. Thomas, 573
P.2d 433, 438 (Cal. 1978) (reversing the conviction of a father convicted of abus-
ing his daughter when the father testified he was merely rubbing cream on her
chest for treatment of a cold, because even if the defendant put his intent in
issue, his alleged prior contact with another daughter was too remote to be pro-
bative of his "present intent to gratify his passions" through sexual contact with
his daughters), overruled by People v. Tassel, 679 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1984) (en bane).
96. 918 F.2d 848, 850 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 1261, and
cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 113 S. Ct. 486 (1992); see also United
States v. Bender, 33 M.J. 111, 112 (C.M.A. 1991) (reiterating the lower court's
holding that in a case in which the charged crime was fondling and digitally
penetrating the defendant's ten-year-old daughter, and one element of the
crime charged was deriving sexual gratification from that act, testimony by an-
other young girl that the defendant had fondled her on numerous occasions is
admissible to show intent and motive, despite lack of defense that the acts at
issue were accidental or medicinal).
97. Hadley, 918 F.2d at 850.
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testified and been impeached on cross-examination, the trial
judge admitted the testimony of two young adult men that Had-
ley had repeatedly molested them while they were minors. Had-
ley argued that the acts were inadmissible because he did not
contend that he lacked intent, but instead denied participation
in the acts charged.98 His counsel had offered not to argue the
issue of intent to the jury.99 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit
held that the evidence was admissible because it went to crimi-
nal intent, and that the government had the burden of proving
intent, regardless of whether the defendant relied on that de-
fense or not.100 A conflict exists on this point, however, with a
number of courts holding that a significant dispute over the is-
sue must exist before the court may receive uncharged conduct
to show intent.' 0 '
98. Id. at 851.
99. Id. at 852.
100. Id.
101. See United States v. Gamble, 27 M.J. 298, 304 (C.M.A. 1988) (quoting
with approval a passage from the Military Rules of Evidence Manual stating
that, when the charged crime is nearly always intentional, a court should de-
cline to receive uncharged misconduct evidence on the issue of intent until after
the defendant has submitted evidence, in order to see whether the defendant
challenges intent); Thompson v. United States, 546 A.2d 414, 423 (D.C. 1988)
("[W]here intent is not controverted in any meaningful sense, evidence of other
crimes to prove intent is so prejudicial per se that it is inadmissible as a matter
of law."); Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726, 733 (Del. 1988) ("The defendant denied
any sexual contact with his daughter. While the defendants plea of not guilty
required the State to prove an intentional state of mind as an element of the
offense, the plea itself did not present a predicate issue concerning intent suffi-
cient to justify the State in attempting to negate lack of intent as part of its
case-in-chief.").
Commentators generally agree that intent ought to be in actual dispute.
See, e.g., LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 43, at 224-25 (discussing the ad-
missibility of evidence to prove intent). Kenneth Graham agrees that intent
should be in serious dispute, but recognizes that authority exists to the con-
trary. 22 WmiGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 40, § 5242, at 488-89 (citing relevant
cases); see also People v. Thomas, 573 P.2d 433, 443 (Cal. 1978) (Clark, J. dis-
senting) (arguing that when the defendant claimed that, to illuminate his true
intent or absence of mistake, he was rubbing vaporizing cream on his daugh-
ter's chest, the court should allow other daughters to testify that the defendant
molested them), overruled by People v. Tassel, 679 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1984) (en banc);
State v. Wermerskirchen, 497 N.W.2d 235 (Minn. 1993) (holding that in a case
in which the defendant denied sexually touching his eight-year-old daughter,
saying any contact was "at most" accidental, to show intent, the lower court
properly admitted testimony from the defendant's nieces and twenty-year-old
daughter as to similar touching when they were children).
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In adult rape cases, most courts hold that intent is not in
issue. 10 2 In Wigmore's words:
Where the charge is of rape, the doing of the act being disputed, it is
perhaps still theoretically possible that the intent should be in issue;
but practically, if the act is proved, there can be no real question as to
intent; and therefore the intent principle has no necessary
application.
1 0 3
In the great majority of rape trials, the defense is either al-
ibi (mistaken identity) or consent. If the defendant offers an al-
ibi, he denies committing the act, and therefore his mens rea is
not an issue. In such a case, the exception for evidence of intent
is obviously inapplicable.
If the defense is consent, the propriety of evidence of intent
is more problematic. Because force is one of the elements of
rape,104 proof that the accused committed the act of rape nor-
mally dispels any reasonable doubt about his intention to have
102. See SusAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE, 94-95 & nn.9-13 (1987) (citing relevant
cases); see also State v. Saltarelli, 655 P.2d 697 (Wash. 1982) (en banc). In
Saltarelli, the court held that when the defendant, charged with the rape of an
acquaintance, raised the consent defense, the trial court committed reversible
error when it received into evidence testimony of the defendants prior at-
tempted rape of a different woman. Id. at 698. The court reasoned that the
evidence was not admissible on an intent theory. Id. at 700-01. But see United
States v. Reynolds, 29 M.J. 105 (C.M_.A 1989). In Reynolds, a consent-defense
rape case, the prosecution indicated that the defendant took his date to his
room, showed her a slide show that included music, and then forcibly raped her.
Id. at 105. "[Tlhe theory of the defense was that [the defendant] was exper-
ienced and successful with women, that he was a romantic, a poet, an amateur
'photojournalist,' and a Top Gun' pilot, who would never resort to rape to over-
come the will of a woman." Id. at 107. The defense contended that the com-
plainant either consented or misled him into thinking she was consenting. Id.
The court held that evidence of other similar sexual assaults was admissible to
show "intent, scheme or design" to have intercourse with his dates whether or
not they consented. Id. at 110.
103. 22 WioMoRE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 37, § 357. Historically, courts
and legislatures have made resistance by the woman and force by the man es-
sential elements of rape. Consequently, focusing on the rapists mens rea has
not been necessary; if the victim resisted and the rapist overcame her by force,
the crime must have been intentional. This may be why some courts have held
that the perpetrator's intentions are immaterial. See generally ESTRICH, supra
note 102, at 95 & nn.12-13 (discussing cases calling into question the role of the
element of intent as to consent in rape cases). Insofar as modern statutes and
decisions dispense with the resistance requirement, and move beyond a narrow,
"schoolboy" concept of force, it becomes more plausible to assert that the defend-
ant, because he was mistaken about consent, may have performed the act of
rape without intending to do so. Judging by the reported cases, however, most
defendants still claim that the woman in fact consented, rather than that the
defendant made a good faith mistake about consent.
104. See generally RoLLiN M. PSmRNs & RONALD N. BOYLE, CRumNAL LAw
210-12 (3d ed. 1982).
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nonconsensual sex. Perhaps partly for this reason, cases in
which the defendant asserts that he lacked the requisite mens
rea are relatively rare; normally the acquaintance rape defend-
ant simply claims that the woman consented. 10 5 But it is diffi-
cult to draw sharp lines between issues of consent, force, and
mistake. Even if the defendant does not raise the issue, the jury
may decide that he made a reasonable mistake as to consent and
acquit him for that reason.
Moreover, intent may be relevant as an evidentiary fact
even if it is not an ultimate issue in the case. If a defendant
initiated a sexual encounter with the intent to have intercourse
regardless of consent, the existence of that intent increases the
likelihood that he in fact had intercourse without consent.
Some courts have held that a defendant puts intent in issue
when he claims consent as a defense. 10 6 A Texas appellate
court, for example, held that a rape defendant who pleads con-
sent necessarily denies that he intended to have non-consensual
sexual intercourse with the complainant.' 07
Other courts have held that intent is not an issue in the ab-
sence of a defense explicitly based on mistake about consent. In
People v. Tassell,'08 a rape case, the California Supreme Court
decided that the intent theory was not available to the prosecu-
tion. The trial court had admitted evidence of other rapes to
show a common plan and to corroborate the victim's testi-
mony.'0 9 The court took the opportunity to discuss exceptions to
the rule against prior crimes evidence.110 The exception for evi-
dence of intent, said the court, did not apply in this case.":' The
court held that intent becomes an issue only when the defense is
105. But cf Regina v. Morgan, 1976 App. Cas. 182. Some courts declare
that an intention to have non-consensual sex is not an element of rape. See
generally ESTRCH, supra note 102, at 92-100. But there are a number of stat-
utes and decisions which declare that a reasonable mistake as to consent is a
valid defense to rape. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 638 P.2d 1, 5 n.7 (Colo. 1981).
106. See, e.g., State v. Gardner, 391 N.E.2d 337, 342 (Ohio 1979) (per
curiam) (holding that because the defendant contended that he did not intend
to commit forcible rape, but instead intended to participate in consensual sex-
ual intercourse, the element of intent was a material fact in issue); State v.
Willis, 370 N.W.2d 193, 198 (S.D. 1958) (holding that the defense of consent
"begets the establishment of intent as a material issue" and that the prosecu-
tion may use other crimes evidence to establish intent).
107. Rubio v. State, 607 S.W.2d 498, 501 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
108. 679 P.2d 1, 7-8 & nn.6-7 (Cal. 1984) (en banc).
109. Id. at 4.
110. Id. at 4-8.
111. Id. at 7 n.7.
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mistake or accident.112 Here the defendant undoubtedly in-
tended to have intercourse; the issue was simply consent,"13 If
the trier believed the defendant's version, the complaining wit-
ness freely consented; if the trier believed the victim's version,
the defendant forced her with threats and violence to have inter-
course. The defense made no claim of reasonable mistake." 4
5. Other non-character purposes
By preceding the list of examples with the words "such as,"
Rule 404(b) indicates that the listed purposes governing the in-
troduction of other crimes evidence are only illustrative. 115 The
court may admit misconduct evidence for a purpose not enumer-
ated, if that purpose does not involve character reasoning.116
Although the list is fairly comprehensive, courts occasion-
ally invent additional labels. 117 For example, one finds state-
ments that evidence of a "pattern" of criminal conduct is
admissible. In a 1987 Minnesota case"x8 involving the rape of
an adult, the court upheld the admission of evidence that the
defendant had committed two sex crimes against children on the
ground that the evidence showed a "pattern" of "opportunistic
sexual assault" on "vulnerable" victims."19 In cases like this, the
"pattern" is so broad that admitting pattern evidence is indistin-
guishable from admitting character evidence.120
112. Id.
113. Id. at 8.
114. Id.
115. Rule 404(b) provides, in relevant part:
"Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident
... ." FED. R. Evm. 404(b) (emphasis added).
116. See Getz v. State, 538 A2d 726 (Del. 1988) (supporting the principle
that Rule 404(b) is illustrative, not exhaustive); 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra
note 40, § 5240 (supporting the principle that the list is illustrative, not
exhaustive).
117. See 22 WRIGT & GAHAUm, supra note 40, § 5248, at 520 (listing other
purposes, such as proof of guilty knowledge through evidence of spoilation).
118. State v. Crocker, 409 N.W.2d 840 (Minn. 1987).
119. Id. at 843.
120. Some cases achieve a similar breadth and vagueness by merely reciting
a laundry list of permissible purposes without identifying any particular one or
explaining why it is in issue. See, e.g., Rivera v. State, 840 P.2d 933, 940, 941
(Wyo. 1992) (holding that evidence of repeated preying on teenaged girls who
were too intoxicated to consent is admissible to show "intent, motive, plan and
identity"), overruled on other grounds by Springfield v. State, No. 92-162, 1993
WL 362357, at *1,*2 (Wyo. Sep. 21, 1993).
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C. BEYOND RULE 404(b): UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE
OFFERED AS CHARACTER EVIDENCE UNDER THE
LUSTFUL DISPOSITION ExcEPTION
Some jurisdictions have gone beyond Rule 404(b), and have
admitted evidence of uncharged misconduct to show "lustful dis-
position" or "depraved sexual instinct" in cases involving sex
crimes against children.121 Such decisions represent a partial
rejection of the rule against character evidence. As Professor
Edward Imwinkelreid has said, "In some jurisdictions, intellec-
tual honesty triumphed, and the courts eventually acknowl-
edged that they were recognizing a special exception to the norm
prohibiting the use of the defendant's disposition as circumstan-
tial proof of conduct."' 22 Other courts have rejected the "de-
praved sexual instinct" exception because it violates the
prohibition against using character to show conduct. 123
121. See Maynard v. State, 513 N.E.2d 641, 647 (Ind. 1987) (holding that in
a child sexual crime case, uncharged child abuse of a third party by the defend-
ant is admissible to show "depraved sexual instinct" as well as the defendant's
"continuing plan" to exploit and abuse the victim), overruled by Lannan v.
State, 600 N.E.2d 1334, 1339 (Ind. 1992) (holding that the depraved sexual in-
stinct exception is no longer recognized in Indiana); State v. Lachterman, 812
S.W.2d 759, 768 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (affirming the lower court's admission of
prior acts on a "depraved sexual instinct" theory in a case involving homosexual
sodomy with young boys), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1666 (1992); State v. Raye,
326 S.E.2d 333, 335 (N.C. Ct. App.) (holding that prior sexual abuse of the vic-
tim's sister is admissible to show intent and "unnatural lust" of defendant-step-
father), review denied, 332 S.E.2d 183 (N.C. 1985); State v. Tobin, 602 A.2d 528,
531-32 (R.I. 1992) (recognizing the lewd disposition exception to the rule
against character evidence in a case in which evidence of prior acts involved the
same victim); State v. Edward Charles L., 398 S.E.2d 123, 131 (W. Va. 1990)
(holding that in a federal rules state, uncharged misconduct evidence is admis-
sible to show, inter alia, the defendant's lustful disposition toward his children);
State v. Tarrell, 247 N.W.2d 696, 702-03 (Wis. 1976) (holding that the lower
court, to show the defendant's "propensity to act out his sexual desires with
young girls," properly admitted evidence that the defendant had made an ob-
scene remark to a female child and had masturbated in the presence of other
young females), overruled in part by State v. Fishnick, 378 N.W.2d 272, 277
(Wis. 1985) (holding that the language in Tarrell which stated that the court
could receive evidence to show sexual propensity is "withdrawn"). See generally
Myers, supra note 51, at 540 & nn.205-06 (citing relevant cases).
122. IhmWNKEimm, supra note 40, § 4:14, at 437.
123. See, e.g., Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726, 733-34 (Del. 1988) ("The sexual
gratification exception proceeds upon the assumption that a defendant's pro-
pensity for satisfying sexual needs is so unique that it is relevant to his guilt.
The exception thus equates character disposition with evidence of guilt contrary
to the clear prohibition of [Delaware Rule of Evidence] 404(b).").
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The leading case is Lannan v. State,124 a decision that abol-
ished Indiana's "depraved sexual instinct" exception to the rule
against character evidence. 125 The court noted that the excep-
tion reflected two rationales: the high rate of recidivism in child
molestation cases 126 and the special need "to level the playing
field by bolstering the testimony of a solitary child victim-wit-
ness .... " 12 7 The Lannan court concluded that the recidivism
rate of sex offenders is high, but believed it to be no higher than
for drug offenders. 128 Accordingly, the court decided that sex of-
fenses are not special enough to justify a unique exception. 129
In its discussion of the bolstering rationale, the court noted
that sex crimes against children are now thought to be common,
and stated that the depraved instinct exception had its origins
"in an era less jaded than today."130 Noting that the exception
had been created in a 1940s case in which a Superior Court
judge was charged with child sexual abuse,131 the Lannan court
observed that, in that era, the idea that a man who was a pillar
of the community "would force himself sexually upon a child bor-
dered on the preposterous." 32 The court added the following:
Sadly, it is our belief that fifty years later we live in a world where
accusations of child [molestation] no longer appear improbable as a
rule. This decaying state of affairs in society ironically undercuts the
justification for the depraved sexual instinct exception at a time when
the need to prosecute is greater.
13 3
Although a few states have abandoned the "depraved sexual
instinct" exception, many retain it in child sexual abuse cases,
but not in adult rape cases.134 The judges may feel that a desire
124. 600 N.E.2d 1334 (Ind. 1992); accord Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726, 733-34
(Del. 1988) (overruling a prior case recognizing a sexual gratification excep-
tion); State v. Fishnick, 378 N.W.2d 272, 277 (Wis. 1985) (withdrawing lan-
guage in a prior case that endorsed the use of other crimes evidence to prove
sexual propensity).
125. The Indiana Legislature, however, recently passed a statute reinstat-
ing the exception for evidence of sex crimes similar to the charged crime in
cases of child molestation or incest. See House Enrolled Act No. 1342, § 2, Pub.
L. No. 232-1993, 1993 Ind. Legis. Serv. (West) (to be codified at IND. CODE
§ 15 (1994)).
126. Lannan, 600 N.E.2d at 1335.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1336-37.
129. Id. at 1337.
130. Id.
131. Id. (citing State v. Robbins, 46 N.E.2d 691 (Ind. 1943)).
132. Lannan, 600 N.E.2d at 1337.
133. Id.
134. E.g., State v. Jerousek, 590 P.2d 1366, 1372-73 (Ariz. 1979) (upholding
"the 'emotional propensity for sexual aberration exception'" in a child sexual
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for heterosexual intercourse with an adult, even when forced, is
not as unusual or depraved as a desire for sex with a child.'35
Even if one accepts this proposition, it does not justify the ad-
mission of uncharged misconduct evidence to show a "depraved
sexual instinct." Murder, after all, is at least arguably more de-
praved than child abuse, 136 but courts do not routinely admit a
murder defendant's prior homicides.
Even if the courts were consistent in their designation of
crimes as "depraved," the exception would be hard to justify, for
there is no logical nexus between the depravity of a crime and
the appropriate methods of proof. Few would suggest, for exam-
ple, that the hearsay rule should be abandoned in kidnapping
cases.
Another difference between rape and child sexual abuse is
that a rapist may appropriately engage in consensual sex with
other women, but sex with children is always inappropriate.
That difference, however, is irrelevant when the issue is
whether to admit allegations of prior misconduct. The accused
child molester, no less than the rapist, may testify that the al-
leged prior misconduct never occurred. Instead of claiming con-
sent, as the accused rapist could, the child molester may claim
that the child misidentified him or misinterpreted his conduct,
or is simply lying.
abuse case in which the act was similar to the charged crime and was commit-
ted shortly before or after the charged crime); State v. Tobin, 602 A.2d 528, 532
(R.I. 1992) (upholding the "lustful disposition" exception, at least in cases in-
volving prior incestuous relations between the defendant and the victim); State
v. Edward Charles L., 398 S.E.2d 123, 133 (W.Va. 1990) (holding that in a fed-
eral rules state, uncharged misconduct evidence is admissible to show lustful
disposition toward children). Contra State v. McFarlin, 517 P.2d 87, 90 (Ariz.
1973) (limiting the lustful disposition exception to cases involving sexual aber-
ration, such as sodomy or child abuse); State v. Valdez, 534 P.2d 449, 451-52
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1975) (stating in dictum that the lustful disposition exception is
not available in an adult rape case, even though the court ultimately admitted
the evidence on a common plan rationale); Lehiy v. State, 501 N.E.2d 451, 453
(Ind. App. 1987) (holding pre-Lannan that heterosexual rape evidence is not
admissible under the lustful disposition exception, unless there are "earmark-
ing" trails, although evidence of incest or "sodomy" would be admissible), va-
cated and adopted by Lehiy v. State, 509 N.E.2d 1116 (Ind. 1987).
135. See, e.g., Reichard v. State, 510 N.E.2d 163 (Ind. 1987) (stating that the
rape of an adult woman does not fit the then-recognized "depraved sexual in-
stinct" exception because the rape of an adult woman is not depraved sexual
conduct).
136. "Depraved" means "corrupt, wicked, or perverted." RANDoM HOUSE
DIcTIoNARY OF T=u ENGLISH LANGUAGE 535 (2d unabr. ed. 1987). Unless "per-
verted" is given a purely sexual meaning, murder seems to fit the definition at
least as well as child abuse.
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D. TIE STATE OF THE LAW, CONCLUDED
Generalizing about this body of law is difficult. In many ju-
risdictions, the law is in a state of confusion. One can draw two
general conclusions, however. One is that the admission of sex
crimes evidence is still a common basis for reversal of trial court
decisions.13 7 Despite the willingness of some courts to manipu-
late the Rule 404(b) categories to receive evidence of uncharged
sex offenses, courts do not universally or uniformly treat sex of-
fenses differently from other crimes. 138 The other conclusion is
that courts in a number of states are less likely to admit un-
charged misconduct evidence in acquaintance rape cases than in
stranger rape or child abuse cases.139 This is due to the unwill-
ingness of some courts to admit modus operandi evidence in con-
sent defense cases, because identity is not in issue when the
defense is consent. These courts would admit such evidence in a
stranger rape/alibi defense case. 140 Similarly, in child sex abuse
cases in which identity is not in issue, some courts invoke the
"depraved sexual instinct" exception, which does not apply to
adult rape cases.141
II. POSSIBILITIES FOR REFORM
A. ABOLITION OF THE RULE AGAINST CHARACTER EVIDENCE
The simplest way to resolve the conflicts and ambiguities in
the law concerning uncharged misconduct evidence would be to
abolish the rule against character evidence and to freely admit,
for the purpose of showing criminal propensities, testimony
about the accused's prior crimes. Although wholesale abolition
of the rule is not on the immediate legal horizon, those who dis-
like the rule will naturally be inclined to support ad hoc excep-
tions that gradually undermine it.
137. See supra notes 9, 10.
138. See supra notes 9, 10.
139. See, e.g., Lovely v. United States, 169 F.2d 386, 391 (4th Cir. 1948)
(holding that in consent defense (acquaintance rape) cases in which identity is
not an issue, courts should not admit other crimes evidence); Brown v. State,
459 N.E.2d 376, 379 (Ind. 1984) (concluding that when the defendant admitted
that the act of intercourse occurred and claimed that the complainant con-
sented, evidence of other alleged rapes is inadmissible).
140. See supra note 55 (citing relevant cases). Of course, some counter-ex-
amples exist in jurisdictions in which courts using "spurious plan" reasoning
equally admit the evidence in both situations. See supra note 73 and accompa-
nying text.
141. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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Much can be said in favor of abandoning the rule against
character evidence. To begin, the character evidence doctrines
are extremely complicated. They produce huge quantities of ap-
pellate litigation 142 which does little to dispel the confusion.
More speculatively, one may surmise that exclusion of prior
crimes evidence undermines the legitimacy and acceptability of
acquittals in some criminal cases.143
The rule excluding uncharged misconduct is contrary to the
trend in evidence law toward free proof. For centuries, the
movement has been toward abolition of those exclusionary rules
that have as their basis the danger of misleading the fact-
finder.'4 Jurists and scholars alike increasingly have agreed
with Bentham that technical rules of evidence designed to pre-
vent fact-finders from making mistakes are, at best, more
trouble than they are worth.' 45
Yet powerful arguments can be advanced in favor of retain-
ing the rule. One can find support for the rule against character
reasoning in the literature on personality theory.' 46 Character
reasoning is logical only if humans possess underlying traits of
character that make their behavior consistent in various types
of situations. Many psychologists are skeptical about "trait the-
ory," maintaining that human behavior is situationally specific
and that character traits do not produce cross-situational stabil-
142. ImwInmLREm, supra note 41, § 1:04 (finding that a LEXIS search re-
vealed over 3,000 cases); WIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 40, § 5239 (stating that
"[t]here is no question of evidence more frequently litigated in appellate courts
than the admissibility of other crimes, wrongs, or acts"). On the topic of the
admissibility of uncharged sex crimes in sex crime cases, there were 95 pub-
lished appellate opinions in the year 1992 alone.
143. Cf. Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and
the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1357, 1357 (1985) (arguing that
"the need to promote public acceptance of verdicts can better explain many evi-
dentiary rules").
144. See generally WILLIAM L. TwINNG, THEoms OF EVIDENCE: BENTHM
AND WIGMORE (1985) (describing Bentham's advocacy of free proof and its im-
pact on scholarship today).
145. Id.
146. See Miguel A. Mendez, California's New Law on Character Evidence:
Evidence Code Section 352 and the Impact of Recent Psychological Studies, 31
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1003, 1041-60 (1984), and David P. Leonard, The Use of Char-
acter to Prove Conduct: Rationality and Catharsis in the Law of Evidence, 58
U. CoLo. L. REV. 1 (1986-87) for examples of commentators who find considera-
ble support for the rule against character reasoning in psychology literature.
For a more permissive view of character evidence based on an interactionist
perspective, see Susan M. Davies, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: A
Reassessment of Relevancy, 27 Cmrn. L. BuLL. 504, 518-19 (1991).
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ity of behavior. 147 For example, research indicates that children
exhibit little consistency in deceitful behavior: a child might lie
at school but not at home, or might cheat on an exam but not in
sports.148
Although this research is instructive, situationism is not a
consensus position among psychologists. Some scholars support
trait theory and reject the situationist position.149 Others argue
for another approach to the study of behavior, interactionism,
which emphasizes the need to consider both a person's relevant
traits and the specifics of the situation in predicting behavior. 150
Another group maintains that one can observe stability for cer-
tain traits, such as aggressiveness, but not for others.151
147. Leonard, supra note 146, at 26-29; see generally WALTER MISCHEL, PER-
SONALITY AND ASSESSMENT (1968); 1 HUGH HARTSHORNE & MARK A. MAY, STUD-
IES IN THE NATURE OF CHARACTER 411412 (1928) (reporting the results of a
study measuring the situational specificity of traits).
148. The results of the Hartshorne and May study show that deceit and hon-
esty are not "unified character traits, but rather specific functions of life situa-
tions. Most children will deceive in certain situations and not in others." 1
HARTSHORNE & MAY, supra note 147, at 411; see also PETER D. SPEAR ET AL.,
PSYCHOLOGY: PERSPECTIVES ON BEHAVIOR 574-76 (1988) (describing the Harts-
home and May and other studies). But cf Roger V. Burton, Generality of Hon-
esty Reconsidered, 70 PSYCHOL. REV. 481 (1963) (reanalyzing the Hartshorne
and May study and finding greater generality of behavior even though situa-
tional factors still account for much variance).
149. JACK BLOCK, LIVES THROUGH TmE 9-10 (1971); James J. Conley, Longi-
tudinal Stability of Personality Traits: A Multitrait-Multimethod-Multiocca-
sion Analysis, 49 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1266, 1266 (1985) (stating
that "[tihe data of this longitudinal study carried out over five decades strongly
indicate that there is a set of personality traits that are generalizable across
methods of assessment and are stable throughout adulthood."); see generally
David C. Funder & Daniel J. Ozer, Behavior as a Function of the Situation, 44
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 107, 111 (1983) (finding that "even some situa-
tional factors that must be considered important do not possess quite [a large]
degree of predictive power, just as dispositional factors do not"); David Crump,
How Should We Treat Character Evidence Offered to Prove Conduct?, 58 U.
COLO. L. REV. 279, 283 (1987) (asserting that "social science is by no means
monolithic in condemning trait theory... [but] the literature suggests an am-
bivalence toward both trait and situation theory").
150. Norman S. Ender & J.M. Hunt, Generalizabity of Contributions From
Sources Of Variance in the S-R Inventories of Anxiousness, 37 J. OF PERSONAL-
Try 1 (1969).
151. [T]he evidence essentially shows that some people are indeed apt
to act the same way whenever an aggressive opportunity arises. If
they are relatively free to do what they want in a given situation, there
is a good chance that these individuals will behave in the same manner
on many occasions. They will try to hurt someone if they have an un-
derlying aggressive disposition, or they will not attack a target if they
have a non-aggressive personality.
LEONARD BERKOWITZ, AGGRESSION: ITS CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND CONTROL
128 (1993).
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Even if a defendant's character is an invalid basis for some
superficially plausible inferences, it may be a valid basis for
others. Heinrich Himmler, for example, disapproved of hunting
on the ground that "every animal has a right to live."15 2 This
startling fact shows that, contrary to what one would expect,
Himmler did not possess a general trait of "cruelty toward living
creatures." It does not follow, however, that Himmler lacked the
trait of "cruelty toward Slavs" or even the more general trait of
"cruelty toward humans." The key, perhaps, is not the intrinsic
reliability of character analysis but the sophistication with
which one attempts to infer propensity. Jack the Ripper may
have had no unusual propensity to kill men, and he may even
have been highly selective in picking the prostitutes who were
his victims. No doubt in many situations-a crowded street for
example-he would not have killed anyone. But it would be ab-
surd to deny that he was more likely than the average man to
kill a female prostitute.
Similarly, the character trait "sex criminal," a propensity to
commit many different sex crimes, may not exist. Even the pro-
pensity to commit a specific sex crime such as rape may be situa-
tional. Perhaps "date rapists" rarely crawl through basement
windows to rape strangers; even on dates, they may rape only in
certain situations or with certain types of women. Granting all
these possibilities, it remains true that one can describe a man
who has raped some of his dates as "a date rapist," meaning
someone who is much more likely than the average man to rape
a date. Unless one knows that this propensity does not extend
to the situation in which the crime charged allegedly occurred,
his prior rapes are relevant evidence of his guilt.
Even if character evidence is potentially useful, perhaps
courts should exclude it on the ground that juries tend to overes-
timate its value. The results of psychological experiments sug-
gest that research participants tend to attribute too much
influence to a person's disposition, and not enough to the situa-
tion, in assessing causes of human behavior. 153 For example,
152. ALAN BuLLocK, HMER AND STALIN: PARALLEL LIVEs 721 (1991).
153. See Teree E. Foster, Rule 609(a) in the Civil Context: A Recommenda-
tion for Reform, 57 FORDHAm L. REv. 1, 33 (1988) (reporting that "[t]he function
of character traits is exaggerated, whereas the function of situational variances
as pivotal factors influencing the behavior of others is minimized"); Robert G.
Lawson, Credibility and Character: A Different Look at an Interminable Prob-
lem, 50 NoTma DAME L. Rv. 758, 778 (1975) (stating that "[iut is predictable...
that when jurors receive information about prior criminal acts of an accused
they impute to him a dispositional quality and give inadequate attention to the
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even if told that a debater had no choice about which side to take
in a debate, people tend to believe that the debater actually
agrees with the position the debater is arguing. 54
This research, however, is mainly directed toward showing
the process by which people make social judgments, not the ex-
ternal validity of judgments about character. Attribution error
researchers have tended either to ignore the accuracy question,
or to assume, without actual testing, that character attributions
are inaccurate.155 Moreover, some critics have charged that the
professional literature is based in favor of reporting human er-
ror-either because it is easier to study, or simply because it
makes a better story.156
possibility of situationally oriented explanations for his conduct"); cf. Robert G.
Spector, Rule 609: A Last Plea for Its Withdrawal, 32 OKLA. L. REv. 334, 353
(1979) (asserting that "[tihe jury, like any individual, is incapable of segregat-
ing [evidence of prior bad acts] to just one trait... [and that the jury] will
inevitably use it to form a complete picture of the [defendant]").
Commentators also have pointed out that research participants display a
tendency to judge character in a reductionist fashion, concentrating on one or
two salient personality traits and ignoring complexities. See Mendez, supra
note 146, at 1047.
Perhaps the factor that most induces jurors to overestimate the proba-
tive value of character evidence is what psychologists term the "halo
effect." In the present context it might be more aptly called the "devil's
horns effect." The term refers to the propensity of people to judge
others on the basis of one outstanding "good" or "bad" quality. This
propensity may stem from a tendency to overestimate the unity of per-
sonality - to see others as consistent, simple beings whose behavior in
a given situation is readily predictable.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
154. In one well-known experiment, for example, participants were asked to
form a judgment about whether a debater favored Fidel Castro. See Edward E.
Jones, The Rocky Road from Acts to Dispositions, 34 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 107
(1979) (describing Castro experiments). Even if told that the debater had no
choice, because the debate team advisor had instructed the debater whether or
not to support Castro, the participants were more likely to attribute a pro-Cas-
tro attitude to the debater if the debater spoke in favor of Castro than if the
debater spoke against Castro. Id. at 108.
155. David C. Funder, Errors and Mistakes: Evaluating the Accuracy of So-
cial Judgement, 101 PSYCHOL. BuLL. 75 (1987); Davies, supra note 146, at 528-
30.
156. Funder, supra note 155, at 75. One researcher, who has a relatively
optimistic view of the ability of humans to make judgments about dispositions,
has gone so far as to complain that "[sltudies of error appear in the literature at
a prodigious rate, [and] are disproportionately likely to be cited, and fill whole
books." Id. at 75 (citations omitted). Furthermore, he argues that "the current
Zeitgeist emphasizes purported flaws in human judgment to the extent that it
might well be 'news' to assert that people can make global judgments of person-
ality with any accuracy at all." Id. at 83.
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On the whole, personality theory probably lends some sup-
port to the idea that character evidence is more prejudicial than
informative. The research, however, has not achieved the level
of acceptance that one sees, for example, in eyewitness testi-
mony research. In addition, its applicability to legal issues is
sometimes questionable.
The real danger in admission of character evidence is that
the jury will give the evidence more weight than it deserves,
either by overestimating its probative value on the crime
charged or by concluding that even if the defendant is innocent
of the crime charged, he is a "bad man" who belongs in jail. At
the very least, jurors-and police and prosecutors-who know
about the defendant's prior crimes, may not be sufficiently dili-
gent in resolving gaps and conflicts in non-character evidence.
To express the point in terms of decision theory, jurors will
seek to minimize their expected regret over reaching incorrect
decisions. 157 They will weigh the regret they expect from a con-
viction against the regret they expect from an acquittal. Jurors
will anticipate less regret over wrongfully finding the defendant
guilty if they believe that he or she committed other crimes.1 58
They will therefore be more willing to convict in cases where the
other evidence of guilt is weak.
A subsidiary, but significant, benefit of the rule against pro-
pensity evidence is that it limits the scope of the proceedings.
Excluding propensity evidence saves time and money by
preventing the trial of collateral issues. It also protects the par-
ties from surprise. The prosecution should not force the accused
to defend his past behavior without an adequate chance to pre-
pare. Although notice and discovery can reduce the danger of
surprise, these procedures also add complexity and expense to
the system.
The cost of the rule against propensity evidence is that a
certain number of criminals go free. Observers will have differ-
ing opinions about whether this price is worth the benefits of the
rule. For our part, we are not prepared to scrap the general
rule, but are willing to consider novel exceptions on their indi-
vidual merits.
157. See LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 43, at 162 (discussing prejudice
in terms of regret matrix of jurors).
158. Id. at 165.
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B. A GENERAL EXCEPTION FOR SEX CRIES
Some reformers contend that, although the general rule
against uncharged misconduct evidence is sensible, an exception
should exist for cases involving sex crimes. Such a proposal is
now pending in Congress in the form of a bill to amend the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, adding three new rules. 159 Proposed
Rule 413 would provide that for a defendant accused of an of-
fense of sexual assault, evidence of his commission of another
sexual assault is admissible. 160 Jurors may consider this evi-
dence for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.'
6
'
Proposed Rule 414 would make the same provision for criminal
child molestation cases, and proposed Rule 415 would do so for
civil cases involving sexual assault or child molestation. 162 The
proposed rules provide for notice before trial to the accused of
the nature of the alleged prior misconduct.
163
Whether exclusion under Rule 403164 would still be avail-
able to an accused seeking to challenge the admissibility of this
evidence is unclear. The proposed rules do not mention Rule
403,165 and one could plausibly construe the text of the bill to
create an exception to the rule. Instead of saying that the evi-
dence "may" be admissible, as in Rule 404(b), 166 the language of
the proposed rules reads that the sexual history evidence "is"
admissible, and that jurors may consider the evidence "on any
matter to which it is relevant."167 One of the supporters of the
bill claims, however, that Rule 403 would still be available as a
backup. 168





164. Fed. R. Evid. 403 gives the opponent of evidence a basis for challenging
it when none of the more specific exclusionary rules applies. It provides,
"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or need-
less presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EvID. 403.
165. See S. 1607, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 121 (1993).
166. FED. R. EVD. 404(b).
167. S. 1607, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 121 (1993).
168. See 137 CONG. REC. E3503-02 (Extensions of Remarks, Oct. 22, 1991)
(statement of Rep. Molinari about predecessor legislation) (alluding to Rule 403
as a possible basis for exclusion); cf. 137 CONG. REC. S3191-02, 3193 (daily ed.
Mar. 13, 1991) (statement by Senator Thurmond, on behalf of 27 sponsors of the
Comprehensive Violent Crime Control Act of 1991) (inserting a section-by-sec-
tion analysis of the bill in the Congressional Record) [hereinafter Section-by-
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Even if Rule 403 would still be available, the proposed rules
would broaden the admissibility of sexual history evidence. In
cases covered by the proposed rules, the rule against character
reasoning would be replaced by a rule permitting character rea-
soning, subject to exclusion if the prejudicial effect of the evi-
dence "substantially" outweighs its probative value.
The proposed rules do contain some limitations on the ad-
missibility of uncharged misconduct evidence. The uncharged
misconduct itself must be a serious offense; 169 sexual miscon-
duct that does not rise to the level of a serious crime would still
require screening under Rule 404(b).170 On the other hand, the
new rules would have some potentially broad effects. For exam-
ple, if courts read proposed Rule 414 literally and without quali-
fication, evidence that the defendant previously had consensual
intercourse with a 13-year-old girl would be admissible in a sub-
sequent case in which the defendant allegedly had sex with a 5-
year-old boy. 17 '
One way to analyze this bill is by asking whether its provi-
sions are consistent with the way the law treats character evi-
dence in other areas. One possible inconsistency is with rape
shield laws, under which courts exclude evidence of the putative
victim's sexual history, subject to certain exceptions such as evi-
dence of sexual intimacy with the accused. 172 One might argue
Section Analysis]. The analysis applicable to proposed Fed. R. Evid. 413415 is
at 137 CONG. REc. S3191-02, S3238-42 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991). The 1991 pro-
posed Rules 413415 are identical to the 1993 proposed evidence rules, and the
sponsors of the 1991 bill overlap with those of the 1993 bill.
169. The proposed rule would apply to evidence that the defendant had pre-
viously committed a federal child molestation offense, any other child molesta-
tion offense involving anal or genital contact, sex crime involving anal or
genital contact with an adult, any offense that involves deriving sexual gratifi-
cation from the infliction of death, bodily injury, or physical pain on another
person, and any attempt or conspiracy to engage in the above-described con-
duct. S.1607, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 121 (1993).
170. FED. R. Evm. 404(b).
171. See supra note 169.
172. For a comprehensive review of the provisions of rape shield statutes,
see Harriett R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts:
A Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MmN. L. REv. 763 (1986).
In its strongest form, rape shield legislation protects the victim from disclo-
sure of sexual history except in cases in which the evidence concerns other sex-
ual acts with the defendant himself, or in which the evidence is necessary to
show the source of semen or injury. See FED. R. EvID. 412. Even in these juris-
dictions, however, the Constitution will require reception of some other types of
evidence, as when the evidence suggests a motive to fabricate a charge of rape.
See Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227 (1988) (per curiam) (holding it unconstitu-
tional to prevent the defendant from cross-examining the accuser about the pos-
sibility that the victim was fabricating the rape to protect her relationship with
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that because the law excludes the sexual history of the victim, it
should also exclude the sexual history of the accused.
This is not the place to analyze all of the possibly desirable
exceptions to rape shield laws. Suffice it to say that in our view
the basic concept of a rape shield law does not conflict with ad-
mission of evidence of the rape defendant's prior crimes. Rape
shield laws are grounded not only in a desire for accurate ver-
dicts, but also in considerations of extrinsic policy. They are
designed to protect victims from unnecessary embarrassment
and to encourage them to report rape.' 73 These rationales do
not apply to evidence about a defendant's sexual misconduct. In
addition, victims have a legitimate privacy interest in keeping
facts about their sexual history secret. Suppressing evidence of
the defendant's prior sex offenses serves no similar purpose.
One who commits a crime is not entitled to keep that fact
secret.17
4
The most important distinction between exclusion of the vic-
tim's sexual history and exclusion of the defendant's past sexual
misconduct is the probative value of the two types of evidence.
To understand this distinction, one must recognize that the con-
ventional arguments in favor of rape shield laws are not quite
satisfactory. Advocates of rape shield laws have not provided a
fully persuasive justification for the proposition that evidence of
promiscuity is irrelevant to whether the complainant consented
to sex with the defendant.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, evolving sexual mores do
not justify the exclusion of prior sexual history evidence.175
her boyfriend); State v. Jalo, P.2d 1359 (Or. Ct. App. 1976) (declaring it uncon-
stitutional to exclude evidence of a child complainant's prior sexual conduct
when an adult defendant claimed that the child had falsely accused him after
the defendant said he would inform the child's parents of her sexual conduct).
173. See Section-by-Section Analysis, supra note 168, at S3241 (discussing
policy behind rape shield laws). Studies indicate that rape is underreported.
See ESTRICH, supra note 102, at 10-11; John Monahan & Laurens Walker, So-
cial Frameworks: a New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559
(1987).
174. See Section-by-Section Analysis, supra note 168, at S3241.
175. Wigmore expressed the original view: "The character of the woman as
to chastity is of considerable probative value in judging the likelihood of con-
sent." 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM
OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALs AT COMMON LAw § 62 (3d ed. 1940). As Wigmore recog-
nized, however, "The fact that a woman may have been guilty of illicit inter-
course with one man is too slight and uncertain an indicator to warrant the
conclusion that she would probably be guilty with any other man who sought
such favors of her." Id. § 200 (quoting Rice v. State, 17 So. 286, 287 (Fla. 1895)).
Numerous commentators have made the argument that "evolving mores have
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Evolving mores merely establish a new benchmark of normal
sexual experience; they do not rebut the argument that women
who have had an unusually large number of casual sexual part-
ners are statistically more likely to consent than are women of
average sexual habits. To be sure, every woman is entitled to
refuse sex, whenever and with whomever she chooses. But this
right is irrelevant when the issue is whether or not a woman in
fact said no on a particular occasion. Nor can rape shield laws
be justified on the ground that rape is a crime of violence, not of
sex. Classifying rape as a crime of violence addresses why
rather than whether a rape occurred. Finally, it is misleading to
assert that "just because she consented to one man doesn't mean
she consented to another."176 This truism confuses relevance
with conclusiveness.
If the issue were simply whether the defendant and the
complainant had voluntary sex on a certain date, evidence that
she had often done so before (with the same man or even with
other men) would be relevant, though far from conclusive. Sup-
pose, for example, that the woman were being tried for burglary
and she offered an alibi: "On that night I was having sex with
Harry, a fellow I had just met in a bar." In evaluating her alibi,
it would surely be useful-though not conclusive-to know that
she frequently had done this with other men. We would not re-
ject such evidence on the ground that nowadays women often
engage in non-marital sex, nor on the ground that "just because
made extramarital sex normal." E.g., Evelyn Sroufe, Evidence-Admissibility
of the Victim's Past Sexual Behavior Under Washington's Rape Evidence Law-
Wash. Rev. Code § 9.79.150 (1976), 52 WASH. L. REv. 1011, 1031-32 (1976);
Note, If She Consented Once, She Consented Again-A Legal Fallacy in Forcible
Rape Cases, 10 VAL. U. L. REv. 127, 138-43 (1976); Lisa Van Amburg & Su-
zanne Rechtin, Rape Evidence Reform in Missouri: A Remedy for the Adverse
Impact of Evidentiary Rules on Rape Victims, 22 ST. Louis U. L.J. 367, 385
(1978); Vivian Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the
Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 55-56 (1977).
176. The claim that prior consent is relevant to whether subsequent consent
was given to another man usually is rejected out of hand by authors defending
rape shield laws. "[O]ne can presume that a woman will freely choose her part-
ners, picking some and rejecting others, in line with highly personal standards
not susceptible of generalization." Berger, supra note 175, at 56. The fact re-
mains, however, that if the question is whether X and Y had consensual sex on
a certain date, it would be relevant to know that they have often done so with
others, just as similar information would be relevant to analogous inquiries
such as whether they went fishing with each other on a certain date, or went to
church together, or played cards. Whether the evidence, in the context of a
consent defense rape trial, cuts both ways is a different question, as is the dan-
ger that the jury will overvalue the evidence.
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she had sex with other men doesn't mean she had sex with
Harry."
The issue in a consent defense rape case, however, is not
simply whether the alleged victim had consensual sex on a par-
ticular occasion. Rather, the question is comparative: Is the
complainant's or the defendant's account more credible? Did she
consent to sex and then falsely accuse the defendant of rape, or
was she raped? Evidence of her promiscuity' 77 -even if ex-
treme-tends to support both accounts of the incident. On the
one hand, it tends to show, however slightly, that she is the sort
of person who might have consented to casual sex. On the other
hand, her failure to accuse her other lovers of rape tends to
show, however slightly, that she does not readily make rape ac-
cusations in a fit of pique or because of pathological delusions.
As Wright and Graham stated, "If the victim has had twenty
instances of prior sexual conduct with rock stars before without
claiming rape, in the absence of other evidence of motivation the
most reasonable inference is that she claimed rape this time be-
cause she was raped."1 78
It is also likely that promiscuous women, though more likely
to consent to sex than other women, are also more likely to be
raped, because some men perceive them as more vulnerable
("nobody will believe you"), or as less entitled to decline sex than
other women. Statistically, women who have had numerous sex-
ual partners are more likely to live in high-crime areas, or to
engage in high-risk behavior, or both.'7 9 For these reasons, the
traditional assumption that promiscuous women are more likely
177. We have not been able to find a less pejorative synonym for "promiscu-
ous," but it should be obvious that our purpose here is to describe rather than
censure.
178. 22 WmaGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 40, § 5287, at 584 n.51.
179. Two studies indicate that college rape victims have more partners than
non-victims. This may be because of increased post-rape sexual activity, which
we think unlikely, or because a larger number of dates increases the chances of
encountering a rapist, rather than because women who have had numerous
sexual partners are more vulnerable than other women during any single social
encounter. However, the evidence also suggests that rape victims, as compared
to non-victims, as a class have more liberal sexual attitudes and are more likely
to have sex on first dates, data which tend to support the hypothesis in the text.
See Philip A. Belcastro, A Comparison of Latent Sexual Behavior Patterns Be-
tween Raped and Never Raped Females, 7 VIcTImOLOGY: INT'L J. 224, 225-26
(1982) (stating that students who have been raped had more partners and were
more likely to have had heterosexual coitus on their first date); Mary P. Koss,
The Hidden Rape Victim: Personality, Attitudinal, and Situational Character-
istics, 9 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 193, 201-202, 208 (1985) (stating that "acknowl-
edged rape victims reported significantly more liberal sexual values and a
larger number of sexual partners.., than nonvictimized women did").
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to be lying when they accuse men of rape is at best highly conjec-
tural. In most cases, therefore, a jury has no rational use for
evidence of the victim's sexual history.' 80 In a typical case, the
main impact of such evidence is not to throw light on the issue of
consent but solely to inflame jurors' prejudice against "loose
women."' 8 '
Admittedly, the defendant's prior rapes are not conclusive
evidence that he is guilty of the rape charged. Just as a woman
might consent to sex on one occasion, but not another, a man
might force himself on one woman but not another. His prior
rapes, however, do not support both the defendant's and the vic-
tim's accounts, as does evidence of the victim's sexual history.
One may disagree about their precise evidentiary weight, but
they do have probative value, and it is all on the side of the pros-
ecution. No inconsistency arises, therefore, in admitting evi-
dence of a defendant's prior rapes while excluding evidence of
the victim's prior consensual sex.
Rape victims and women who have had numerous sexual partners both
tend to be younger, more urban, and poorer than the general population.
Kathryn Kost & Jacqueline D. Forrest, American Women's Sexual Behavior and
Exposure to Risk of Sexually Transmitted Diseases, 24 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 244,
246-47 (1992) (stating that women most likely to have many sexual partners
are 20-34 years of age, with an income below the poverty level, and living in an
urban area); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1991 259, 274, 280 (Timothy J.
Flanagan & Kathleen Maguire eds., 1992) (providing similar data concerning
rape victims). Although some scholars have been understandably reluctant to
discuss this subject, because it may be interpreted as "blaming the victim," rec-
ognition that victim characteristics and behavior increase the risk of rape does
not entail absolving the rapist of his crime.
180. Some exceptional cases exist in which the authors' analysis does not
apply because the sexual history evidence is offered, not to show a propensity to
consent, but for some other purpose such as to show a motive for fabrication.
See generally Harriett R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Fed-
eral Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REv. 763, 903 (1986)
(proposing that evidence of a victim's sexual conduct be admissible for purposes
other than showing the propensity to consent).
181. K. L'Armand & A. Pepitone, Judgements of Rape: A Study of Victim-
Rapist Relationship and Victim Sexual History, 8 PERSONALITY AND Soc.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 134, 135-37 (1982) (describing a study of stranger and date
rape scenarios in which defendants were sentenced to 8.5 years when the vic-
tim's sexual history was not mentioned, 7.3 years when the victim was de-
scribed as having limited sexual experience, and 4.5 years when the victim was
described as having had many previous casual sexual relationships); C. Neil
MacRae & John W. Shepherd, Sex Differences in Perception of Rape Victims, 4
J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 278 (1989). MacRae and Shepherd describe an ac-
quaintance rape study in which male and female participants blamed the vic-
tim less if she was a virgin. Id. at 283. The participants also believed that a
virgin was more psychologically damaged by rape. Id.
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The proposed federal statute would, however, mandate a
different sort of inconsistency. It would create a special rule of
free admissibility for sex offenses, while preserving the rule
against character evidence for other offenses. Why should the
rules about admissibility of prior offenses be more liberal when
sex crimes are involved than when the charged crime is, for ex-
ample, arson, manslaughter, robbery, drug-dealing, or murder?
In a case in which a defendant is accused of both rape and mur-
der, would one wish to admit a prior rape by the accused without
any showing of special similarity, while excluding a prior homi-
cide unless it is shown to involve a closely similar modus
operandi?
The available data on recidivism do not support a unique
rule for sex crimes. It is unclear whether the recidivism rate for
sex crimes is higher than for other crimes. In a 1989 Bureau of
Justice Statistics study that followed 100,000 prisoners for three
years after release, the recidivism rate was lower for sex offend-
ers than for most other criminals. According to these figures,
31.9% of released burglars were rearrested for burglary, 24.8%
of drug offenders were rearrested for a drug offense, and 19.6%
of violent robbers were rearrested for robbery. Only 7.7% of rap-
ists were rearrested for rape. Of the offenses studied, only homi-
cide had a lower recidivism rate-2.8%.18 2 A follow-up period of
longer than three years might have yielded a much higher recid-
ivism rate for sex offenders,183 but this might be true for other
crimes as well. Studies of sex offenders with smaller samples
and different follow-up periods have shown both higher and
lower recidivism rates for certain populations of sex offenders,
but no study has demonstrated that sex offenders have a con-
sistently higher or lower recidivism rate than other major of-
182. Allen J. Beck, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
RECIDMSmI OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1983 6 (1989).
183. For scholars who have argued for a longer follow-up period, see Joseph
J. Romero & Linda M. Williams, Recidivism Among Convicted Sex Offenders: A
10-Year Followup Study, 49(1) FED. PROBATION, Mar. 1985, at 58, 63 (1985).
The authors state that the number of sex offenders rearrested for a sex offense
four years after their release from prison equals the number of sex offenders
rearrested for a sex offense within the first year of the follow-up study. They
then conclude that "5 years is minimal as an effective [follow-up] period when
investigating recidivism among sex offenders." For a related view, see Lita
Furby et al., Sex Offender Recidivism: A Review, 105 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3, 27
(1989) (recommending follow-up periods of"at least a decade"); R.G. Broadhurst
& R.A. Maller, The Recidivism of Sex Offenders in the Western Australian
Prison Population, 32 BRIT. J. CRMINOLOGY 54, 72 (1992); David Finkelhor,




fenders studied for the same time period with the same
methods.18 4
Some commentators have suggested that studies based on
rearrest or reconviction vastly understate the rate of recidivism
for sex offenders because sex offenders may commit hundreds of
unreported crimes.' 8 5 This argument is plausible, but it may
also apply to several other types of criminals, such as purse-
snatchers, illegal gamblers, shoplifters, recipients of stolen
goods, drunken drivers, and drug offenders. Although acquain-
tance rape is a grossly underreported offense,' 8 6 this may be
even more true of drug crimes which, being consensual, are no-
toriously hard to detect.
Even if one were to assume that the recidivism rate for all
types of sex crimes is far greater than for any other crime, it
would not follow that evidence of all types of prior sex crimes
should be admissible. The probative value of the evidence, how-
ever high, may be lower than the value the average jury would
184. Furby et al., supra note 183, at 22; see also Finkelhor, supra note 183,
at 134 (discussing studies of recidivism rates for several types of sex offenders).
For an example of a study showing a higher recidivism rate, see Marnie E. Rice
et al., Sexual Recidivism Among Child Molesters Released From A Maximum
Security Psychiatric Institution, 59 J. CONSULTING & CLnCAL PSYCHOL. 381,
386 (1991). This study tracked extrafamilial child molesters incarcerated in a
maximum security psychiatric institution for an average 6.3-year follow-up pe-
riod; 31% of the subjects were convicted of a new sex offense. Id. at 383-84. The
authors, however, noted that the nature of their subjects, maximum security
inmates, may have inflated their recidivism results. Id. at 386. In their com-
prehensive review of sex offender recidivism studies, Furby et al. noted that
"Wthe differences in recidivism across these studies is truly remarkable; clearly
by selectively contemplating the various studies, one can conclude anything one
wants.'" Furby et al., supra note 183, at 27 (quoting Vernon L. Quinsey, Sexual
Aggression: Studies of Offenders Against Women, in 1 LAw AND MENTAL
HEALTH: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 84, 101 (D. Weisstraub ed. 1984)).
185. See, e.g., A. Nicholas Groth et al., Undetected Recidivism among Rap-
ists and Child Molesters, 28 CRME & DELINQ. 450, 453-54 (1982) (describing an
anonymous questionnaire given to convicted and incarcerated rapists and child
molesters in which, on average, the subjects indicated they "committed two to
five times as many sex crimes for which they were not apprehended");
Finkelhor, supra note 183, at 132. Finkelhor noted that ten studies of child
molestation "probably gravely understate the amount of subsequent offending
committed by the men who were studied. The investigators routinely used as
their criteria of recidivism subsequent offenses that came to the attention of the
authorities." Id. See also, e.g., Judith V. Becker and John A. Hunter, Jr., Eval-
uation of Treatment Outcome for Adult Perpetrators of Child Sexual Abuse,
19(1) CRmI. JUST. & BEHAV. 74, 82 (1992) (stating that "[ulndetected crime is
quite extensive among sex offenders and.., official data may reveal only a
small percentage of the total sexual offenses committed").
186. Furby et al., supra note 183, at 27 (stating that no more than 10% of
sex offenses are reported).
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assign to it. Perhaps the recidivism rate for stranger rape or
child molestation is high in comparison with other offenses, yet
lower than jurors commonly believe. Conversely, the recidivism
rate for some other offense, such as murder, may be low but not
as low as jurors suppose. On this hypothesis, the case for admit-
ting a prior stranger rape would be weaker than for admitting a
prior homicide. It is also conceivable that jurors would underes-
timate the likelihood of recidivism by acquaintance rapists be-
cause acquaintance rapists are not usually considered
compulsive.
The sponsor statement in support of the proposed amend-
ments to the Federal Rules of Evidence stresses the inherent im-
probability that a person whose prior acts show him to be a
rapist or child molester would have the bad luck to later be the
victim of a false accusation of the same offense. 187 The plausi-
bility of such a coincidence, however, does not turn on whether
sex crimes are involved, but upon other factors. One factor is
whether the accusations are independent, so that a prior accusa-
tion did not cause a later one. Additional factors include the
number of separate accusations and their similarity. L88 If the
defendant is accused of arson, it would be a bizarre coincidence
if he were independently, but falsely, accused by three unrelated
victims of three other acts of arson. If one is to make a probabil-
istic exception to the rule against character evidence in cases
involving multiple accusations, consistency requires that the ex-
ception apply to all types of cases in which the probative force of
multiple accusations is equally great.' 89
187. Section-by-Section Analysis, supra note 168, at S3240 (analysis appli-
cable to the predecessor bill, introduced in 1991, that had the same evidence
provisions as the 1993 bill).
188. Of these three factors, only similarity is regularly recognized in the
case law as a basis for admission of other crimes evidence. If the acts are suffi-
ciently similar, then they may be admitted as showing modus operandi, plan, or
"common scheme." See supra text accompanying notes 50-53, 63-91.
189. If one assumes that the base rate of false accusations in consent de-
fense cases is very low, then one can make a case for treating consent defense
cases differently, especially when multiple accusations exist. This line of rea-
soning requires an a priori judgment, in our view a reasonable one, that the
likelihood of falsity is lower than for most crimes. It is not, however, unprece-
dented in evidence law, and is simply the reverse side of the a priori judgment,
on which the corroboration requirement was once based, that women commonly
lie about rape. See 7 WIGMORE, supra note 21, § 2062 (Chadbourn rev. 1978)
(describing the corroboration requirement). The argument, however, only ap-
plies to consent defense cases. No proof has been found that the rate of mis-
taken witness identification is lower in sexual offenses than in nonsexual
offenses. But see FAisvm, infra note 193, at 201-05.
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By now, the astute reader has undoubtedly detected some
ambivalence on the authors' part, both in their attitude toward
the character evidence ban and in their attitude toward the pro-
posed exception for sex crimes. Although we ultimately reject
wholesale abolition of the rule against character reasoning, we
regard this issue as a close one. Partly for that reason, we also
see merit in an argument for partial abolition in sex crime cases.
One superficially plausible argument against receiving such evi-
dence, that it would be inconsistent to exclude the victim's sex-
ual history while admitting the sexual history of the accused,
does not withstand careful scrutiny. We believe, however, that a
blanket exception for sex crime cases would be inconsistent with
retention of the rule for other crimes, such as murder and non-
sexual assault.
We now address a more limited proposal: to relax the exclu-
sionary rule in acquaintance rape cases.
C. ADMITTING EVIDENCE MoRE FREELY IN ACQUAINTANCE
RAPE CASES
The argument for receiving uncharged misconduct evidence
is much stronger in acquaintance rape cases than in stranger
rape cases. First, a danger exists in stranger rape cases that the
defendant became a suspect because of prior rapes. This danger
is not present in acquaintance rape cases. In stranger rape
cases, the police may have shown the victim photographs of per-
sons suspected of committing prior rapes, or otherwise may have
focused their investigation on suspected sex offenders. Conse-
quently, the apparently amazing coincidence-that a person
who actually committed prior rapes had the misfortune to be
falsely accused of a subsequent one-is not as incredible as it
sounds. Because suspicion was focused on the defendant as a
result of the prior crime, his chance of being accused, even if
innocent, was fairly high.190 In other words, the accusations of
the various crimes were not wholly independent.
The danger of a false accusation in stranger rape cases is
chiefly due to the problematic nature of identification evidence.
For one thing, police sometimes strongly suggest to the victim
that certain people in the "mug shot" book are the most likely
190. See LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 43, at 217 (suggesting that the
danger that the defendant was identified because he was one of the "usual sus-
pects" for that type of crime undermines the value of other crimes evidence).
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perpetrators. 191 Even without such prodding, eyewitness identi-
fication is a hazardous enterprise. A strong body of social sci-
ence research demonstrates that such identifications, especially
in emergencies, are fraught with difficulties and chances for er-
ror,' 92 and that jurors tend to overrate the ability of witnesses to
make identifications. 193 Thus, in stranger rape cases, evidence
of prior rapes may distract the jury from the task of evaluating
problematic identification evidence.
To some extent courts can guard against these dangers.
The judge could allow the defense to present evidence that the
identification stemmed from the defendant's status as a "usual
suspect." The judge could also allow the defense to present ex-
pert testimony about identification problems. These options,
191. See Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1088 (1986): "Late that
night, I sat in the Police Headquarters looking at mug shots.... They had four
or five to 'really show' me; being 'really shown' a mug shot means exactly what
defense attorneys are afraid it means." See also Robert Buckout, Eyewitness
Testimony, 231 Sci. Am. 23-27 (1974) (describing police practices that might
interfere with accurate identification).
192. See, e.g., ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEwrrNEss TESTimoNY 142-44 (1979)
(stating that unconscious transference can cause a witness to identify a suspect
because the witness saw the suspect, or a photo of the suspect, in a context
other than the crime); Stephanie J. Platz & Harmon M. Hosch, Cross-Racial/
Ethnic Eyewitness Identification: A Field Study, 18 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL.
972, 981-83 (1988) (discussing inaccuracy of cross-racial identification); Eliza-
beth F. Loftus et al., Some Facts about "Weapon Focus", 11 L. & HUM. BEHAV.
55, 61-62 (1987) (stating that "weapon focus" often interferes with identification
capacity); see generally ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, ErwrINEss TEsTIMoNY (1979)
(describing problems with eyewitness identification).
193. See e.g., Bryan L. Cutler et al., Juror Decision Making in Eyewitness
Identification Cases, 12 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 41, 54 (1988) (discussing a study
that found jurors "do not possess the knowledge and skills necessary to ade-
quately assess the reliability of eyewitness identification"); Gary L. Wells, How
Adequate is Human Intuition for Judging Eyewitness Testimony, in EYswrr-
NESS TEsTIMoNy: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERsPECTIvEs, 271-72 (Gary L. Wells & Eliza-
beth F. Loftus eds., 1984) (suggesting jurors be counseled on problems with
eyewitness identification).
One experienced sex crime prosecutor argues that eyewitness identifica-
tions of stranger rapists are usually reliable because the perpetrator and the
victim are in intimate contact for a relatively long period. LnmA A. FAmSTEIN,
SEXUAL VIOINCE: OUR WAR AGAINST RAPE 201-05 (1993). She concedes, how-
ever, that "[w]hile the larger number of sexual assault cases occur under cir-
cumstances that afford the victim a good opportunity to identify the attacker,
there are many rapes.., in which the assailant remains behind his prey or
blindfolds her or covers her head with bed linens or clothing." Id. at 183. Even
if eyewitness identifications of rapists are typically reliable, it remains true
that because of the "mug shot" book, the accusations of multiple stranger rapes
are not wholly independent; moreover, the police may have "steered" a victim
toward a particular suspect. As a result, the jury may regard the identification
as more reliable than it is.
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however, multiply the cost and complexity of the proceeding,
and are not always available as a practical matter. Further,
they may not correct the underlying misapprehensions.19 4
Acquaintance rape, by contrast, is one of those rare crimes
in which both the individual accusations and the cumulative un-
charged misconduct evidence are usually extraordinarily credi-
ble. The credibility of the individual accusations derives from
two sources. First, compared to crimes that involve eyewitness
testimony or circumstantial evidence, the risk of an honestly
mistaken accusation is negligible. Second, the danger of deliber-
ately false accusations is reduced by the unpleasant intrusive-
ness of the police investigation and the well-known prospect that
the defense will launch an all-out attack on the complainant.
Similarly, the uncharged misconduct evidence in an ac-
quaintance rape case is likely to be better than most such evi-
dence, because the accusations are not only individually credible
but are usually independent and uncontaminated by the police
department's focus on "the usual suspects." In acquaintance
rape cases, multiple accusations have a synergistic effect.
If a woman accuses a man of raping her on a date, he may
raise a reasonable doubt by pointing to inconsistencies in her
story, the absence of bruises, or conduct on her part that is
thought to suggest consent or a motive for a vendetta against
him. If two other women also accuse him of date rape, he may
be able to raise similar doubts about each of their individual ac-
counts as well. If one considers all three accusations together,
however, and no reason exists to suspect collaboration among
the accusers, each of their charges will corroborate the others' to
a much greater degree than in cases involving eyewitness identi-
fications derived from "mugshot books" of rapists. Although it
remains conceivable that the defendant is innocent of the crime
charged, the danger of an erroneous conviction appears to be
less in this sort of case than in many ordinary criminal trials. 195
194. See LoFrus, supra note 192, at 200-01.
195. The distinction in erroneous convictions between an acquaintance rape
case and other crimes that are subject to the character evidence rule rests par-
tially on a priori judgments about the likelihood of false accusations. Assuming
false accusations of date rape are rare, multiple accusations strongly corrobo-
rate each other. Admittedly, this belief rests on a generalized judgment about a
social fact that cannot be proven conclusively with scientific evidence. Cf Patri-
cia Frazier & Eugene Borgida, Juror Common Understanding and the Admissi-
bility of Rape Trauma Syndrome Evidence in Court, 12 L. & HUm. BEHAV. 101,
106-07 (1988) (assessing sparse data about false rape reports and concluding




In acquaintance rape cases, the evidence of prior sexual as-
saults by the accused may help to combat prejudice against vic-
tims. Researchers have shown that jurors have a tendency to
blame the victim in acquaintance rape cases. The classic Kalven
and Zeisel jury study presents data suggesting that jurors often
nullify the law of rape by giving decisive weight to the legally
irrelevant contributory negligence of victims in acquaintance
rape cases. 196 Kalven and Zeisel measured the judge-jury disa-
greement rate, which reflected situations in which the jury ac-
quitted, but the judge felt that the jury should have convicted,
the defendant. 197 They examined numerous criminal cases, in-
cluding two types of rape cases. 198 In "aggravated" rape cases
(stranger rape, extra violence, or multiple assailants), the disa-
greement rate was only 12 percent. 199 In "simple" rape cases
(acquaintance rape cases without extra violence), it reached 60
percent.200 Juries thus acquitted much more often than judges
would have done in the "simple" rape cases, but only slightly
more often in stranger rape cases. Interpreting judges' com-
ments, Kalven and Zeisel attributed jurors' leniency to the ju-
rors' belief that the victim had precipitated the event by
behavior such as hitchhiking or wearing provocative clothing.201
Evidence that the defendant raped other victims may counteract
this excessive leniency by suggesting that the defendant would
have raped the victim even without the victim's legally irrele-
vant contributory behavior.
Consent defense rape trials, like some child sexual abuse
trials, are cases in which juries need additional evidence to
reach an informed decision. By its nature, the crime occurs in
private. In consent defense trials, because the accused admits
the act of intercourse, physical evidence that it occurred is un-
helpful. In some cases the complaining witness's version of
events is partially corroborated by physical evidence such as
bruises, but such evidence is often lacking or inconclusive.
In an influential article,20 2 Professor Dale Nance argued
that the organizing principle of evidence law is not the desire to
control the jury in order to prevent it from making foolish or
196. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANs ZEISEL, Tim AMERcAN JuRY 249-54 (1966).
197. Id. at 251-54.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 253.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 249-51.




irrational decisions. 20 3 Instead, he suggested, the fundamental
principle is to encourage the parties to offer the best evidence
they feasibly can obtain. 204 Although no single foundational
principle can explain all evidence law, the Nance hypothesis
identifies one of the driving forces behind rules excluding vari-
ous types of evidence.
The Nance hypothesis provides some guidance when ap-
plied to evidence of the accused's prior crimes. For example, in
stranger rape cases, one concern is that admitting uncharged
misconduct would have a harmful effect on the development of
proof. If the uncharged misconduct rule were relaxed,
prosecutorial resources might be unwisely diverted from the
search for better evidence to the search for or reliance on un-
charged misconduct. Specifically, the prosecution might devote
less attention to evidence tending to disprove the defendant's al-
ibi, or it might forego analysis of blood, hair, or semen showing
the defendant's connection to the crime. These analyses are ex-
pensive205 and the prosecution might prefer to rely on less ex-
pensive uncharged misconduct evidence. In acquaintance rape
cases, on the other hand, the danger that the prosecution might
bypass other sources of evidence is minimal. Aside from the tes-
timony of the alleged victim, the uncharged misconduct is likely
to be the best evidence available.20 6
203. Id. at 294.
204. Id. at 227, 245.
205. Estimates of an experienced sex-crime investigator place the cost of a
semen/DNA test at $400 to $800. Telephone interview with Sergeant Martin-
son, Sex-Crimes Unit, Minneapolis Police Department, Minneapolis, Minn.
(May 20, 1993); see also Sally E. Reaskers, Comment, Trial by Certainty: Impli-
cations of Genetic 'DNA Fingerprints", 39 EMORY L. REv. 309, 322 n.95 (1990)
(stating that costs approximate $200-300 per sample, with samples needed
from the victim, the suspect, and the crime scene); Joseph G. Petrosenelli, Note,
The Admissibility of DNA Typing: A New Methodology, 79 GEo. L.J. 313, 315
n.14 (1990) (stating that private labs charge $325-490 for DNA tests and $750-
1000 for a day of expert testimony about tests).
206. In some cases the prosecution may be able to offer evidence of rape
trauma syndrome, but its utility is problematic. See generally State v. Black,
745 P.2d 12, 13 (Wash. 1987) (en banc) (holding that expert testimony on rape
trauma syndrome is inadmissible because it lacks scientific reliability and
prejudices the defendant); State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn. 1982)
(en banc) (holding that the trial court should not have admitted evidence of rape
trauma syndrome). Although rape trauma syndrome literature describes dif-
ferences between victims who report that they have been raped and nonvictims
who report that they have not been raped, it says nothing about the characteris-
tics of nonvictims who report that they were raped. Conceivably, complainants
who falsely report that they were raped after consensual sexual acts show the
same symptoms of trauma that a genuine victim shows. No knowledge is avail-
able on the subject because such complainants have not been, and perhaps can-
19941
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The evidentiary problems in consent defense cases are
analogous to problems the government faces in prosecutions for
receiving stolen goods. In those prosecutions, courts usually ad-
mit prior crimes, supposedly to show the defendant's criminal
intent.20 7 Such evidence, however, effectively amounts to pro-
pensity evidence. Yet courts are sympathetic to the prosecu-
tion's difficulties in proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
recipient of the stolen goods knew that they were stolen. Courts
have created what one might loosely describe as a rebuttable
presumption of guilty knowledge in cases in which the accused
previously has been guilty of receiving stolen goods.
Despite these considerations, some courts have been less
willing to admit prior crimes evidence in consent defense cases
than in stranger rape and child molestation cases.208 This may
be a vestige of the traditional bias against date rape complain-
ants. At least, it seems to reflect an attitude that defendants in
these cases deserve more protection than accused stranger rap-
ists and child molesters. In some consent defense cases, courts
even deny the minimal relevance of the evidence, stating that
"the fact that one woman was raped has no tendency to prove
that another woman did not consent."20 9 That statement is true
not be, studied. Further, receiving rape trauma syndrome testimony raises
questions of fairness because, unless the defense is allowed to conduct an inva-
sive investigation into the victim's private life, the defense normally will lack
the ability to develop evidence that the victim did not suffer from rape trauma.
207. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
208. One finds this result in opinions reasoning that in consent defense
cases identity is not in issue, so modus evidence is not admissible. A necessary
implication is that courts would decide differently if the case had been a stran-
ger rape case. See supra note 55. In some jurisdictions, no difference would
occur between the two types of rape cases because the evidence of similar mo-
dus would be admissible in consent defense cases under some rubric such as
plan, common scheme, or "pattern." See supra text accompanying note 87.
209. Lovely v. United States, 169 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1948). In Lovely, the
defendant was accused of raping an acquaintance after driving her to a remote
area of a federal military base. Id. at 387-88. The court excluded evidence that
the defendant committed a rape 15 days earlier on the same base, reasoning
that "[t]he fact that one woman was raped.., has no tendency to prove that
another woman did not consent." Id. at 390. In Brown v. State, 459 N.E.2d 376
(Ind. 1984), the defendant met his victim at a gas station and drove her to a
cornfield where he threatened, raped, and beat her. Id. at 377. Two other vic-
tims testified to rapes by the defendant in secluded areas after getting or giving
him rides in a vehicle. Id. at 378-79. The court held that receiving this evi-
dence was reversible error, reasoning that the rape of one woman had no ten-
dency to prove that another woman did not consent. Id. at 379. The court cited
Lovely, 169 F.2d at 390. Id. In United States v. Gamble, 27 M.J. 298 (C.M.A.
1988), affd 33 M.J. 179 (C.M.A. 1991), the court held that it was reversible
error to admit evidence of a prior sexual assault in a consent defense rape case.
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only if one ignores the fact that both women were with the same
man. Certainly the fact that the defendant was willing to use
force in obtaining sex from one woman has some tendency to in-
dicate that he was willing to do so again.
Extralegal considerations influence police, prosecutors, and
especially jurors to allow some acquaintance rapists to go with-
out punishment.210 The same attitudes may influence judges to
some extent as well. Although appellate judges are usually not
the major obstacle to a successful rape prosecution, the judiciary
historically has been exceedingly suspicious of victims of ac-
quaintance rape. This suspicion led to the requirement that
rape complaints be corroborated, 211 to the idea that rape com-
plainants should automatically undergo a mental examina-
tion,212 to instructions warning the jury that rape is easy to
fabricate and hard to disprove,213 and to the requirement of "ut-
most resistance" by the victim. 214 Reconsideration of the rules
concerning prior misconduct evidence in acquaintance rape
cases would be consistent with the pattern of changes elsewhere
in rape law, which is beginning to recognize that acquaintance
rape is a crime as deserving of punishment as other forms of
sexual assault.
At a minimum, the law should abandon the differential
treatment of acquaintance rape cases. The justifications for ad-
Id. at 305. The court reasoned that the fact that one woman was sexually as-
saulted has no tendency to prove another did not consent (citing Lovely, 169
F.2d at 390). Id. at 304.
210. See ESTUCH, supra note 102, at 17-20.
211. See supra note 189.
212. 3A WIG=oRE, supra note 21, § 924, at 736-37.
213. ESMCH, supra note 102, at 54.
214. Id. at 29-31. Estrich describes cases such as Brown v. State, 106 N.W.
536 (1906), which involved neighbors who had known each other all their lives.
Id. at 537. The court held that screaming, pushing, and saying "let me go" was
not enough to satisfy the utmost resistance requirement, even when the defend-
ant grabbed the victim, tripped her, covered her mouth with his hand, and told
her to shut up. Id. at 537-39. Estrich also asserts that the "utmost resistance"
requirement was applied unevenly, a view that is related to her view that ac-
quaintance rape is just as frightening as stranger rape. ESTrMCH, supra note
102, at 25, 32-37. "[O]ne is hard pressed to find a conviction of a stranger, let
alone a black stranger, who jumped from the bushes and attacked a virtuous
white woman, reversed for lack of resistance, even though the woman reacted
exactly as did the women in [acquaintance rape cases.]" Id. at 32-37. Other
sources have argued that racism lies behind the differences in the treatment of
acquaintance and stranger rape, on the ground that stranger rape more often
involves a black man and white woman than does acquaintance rape, but this
argument has not been accompanied by any showing that the common law of
rape differed in jurisdictions, such as England, which lacked substantial racial
minorities.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
mitting uncharged misconduct in those cases are at least as
strong as in stranger rape cases. To the extent that uncharged
misconduct evidence is admissible to show identity in stranger
rape cases because of similarities between different sexual as-
saults, courts should also admit it under the modus operandi ex-
ception to show that the defendant acted with force in
acquaintance rape cases. Indeed, admitting uncharged miscon-
duct evidence in consent defense cases would be sensible even in
circumstances in which it would not be admissible if the defense
were alibi.
For similar reasons, uncharged misconduct evidence proba-
bly should be admissible in child abuse cases, provided that the
current accusation is independent of the uncharged accusa-
tion(s). Yet these cases are more problematic than consent de-
fense rape cases. As in acquaintance rape cases, the
perpetrators may have a pattern of abusive activity, and may
succeed in discrediting individual accusers. In other respects,
however, the problems of proof in child abuse cases are distinc-
tive. The youth of the alleged victim magnifies the need for
some "other evidence," but also magnifies the danger that ad-
mission of that evidence will divert the jury's attention from
weaknesses in the prosecution's case. The involvement of other
children and adults, such as parents and therapists, creates a
danger that the child's accusation will not be truly independent
of other children's stories, or of adults' suspicions, which in turn
may have been fueled by rumors of the defendant's alleged prior
crimes. When making their initial accusations, the children are
probably unaware that they are commencing a process that will
be an ordeal for them. Partly for this reason, the danger that
they are fabricating their complaints is probably greater than in
cases of adult victims. Moreover, in some cases identification
problems make the issues more analogous to stranger rape cases
than to consent defense rapes.
CONCLUSION
The courts have been unduly restrictive about receiving evi-
dence of other rapes by the accused in acquaintance rape cases.
At the least, courts should receive evidence of other rapes as
freely in acquaintance rape cases as in stranger rape cases in
which identity is an issue. One could justify an exception to the
rule against uncharged misconduct that would make the evi-
dence of other rapes freely admissible in acquaintance rape
cases. The pending legislation goes too far, however, in provid-
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ing for free admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence in
all sex offense cases, including stranger rape cases. No justifica-
tion exists for making uncharged misconduct evidence more
freely admissible in stranger rape cases than, for example, in
murder cases.
As a practical matter, all of the arguments discussed in this
Article may be unimportant in comparison with one's substan-
tive attitude toward sex offenses. If one thinks of rape as a
crime similar to other violent felonies, comparable to homicide
or nonsexual assault, for example, one is more likely to accept
the idea that the character reasoning rules should be consistent
across various crimes. If one regards rape as a society-defining
crime, part of a system of oppression that promotes male
supremacy, then one may think that the need to increase the
conviction rate is greater than the need to maintain consistency
across the law of character evidence and greater than the need
to avoid speculative dangers of prejudice in the fact-finding pro-
cess. As usual, beliefs about substance overwhelm beliefs about
process.
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